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A Profession, If You Can Keep It:1 
How Information Technology and Fading 
Borders Are Reshaping the Law Marketplace 
and What We Should Do About It 
Stephen Gillers* 
Technology is changing the way we do business. It has made cross-border trade in goods 
and services easy. Capital is finding ways to profit from the law business. Lawyers strive to 
serve clients wherever they need help, including outside their jurisdiction of admission. 
These changes not only affect how American law firms work, they challenge our system for 
licensing and regulating lawyers. The traditional geocentric model for regulating the bar, 
based on physical place of practice, is unstable today because lawyers can practice physically 
in many places and (virtually) in every place, yet no place in particular.  
 
The next twenty years are likely to see greater transformation in how the American (and 
world) legal professions are organized and ply their services than was true for any 
comparable period in history. We have two choices. We can try to impede these forces in 
order to preserve a familiar and comfortable world that seems to be slipping away. Or we 
can decide that today’s rules should adapt to accommodate and direct the forces at bay in 
order to preserve the values of the American bar, which include the efficient delivery of 
services at reasonable cost. This Article endorses the second goal and describes how we 
might seek to achieve it.  
 
 * Elihu Root Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. This Article benefits 
immeasurably from my work on the American Bar Association’s Commission on Ethics 20/20, the 
ideas of my colleagues there and the staff of the ABA’s Center for Professional Responsibility, and 
the testimony of the witnesses before the Commission. I am grateful to ABA President Carolyn Lamm 
for appointing me to the Commission in 2009 and to Jamie Gorelick and Michael Traynor for their 
wise leadership of it. The Commission will begin to submit its recommendations to the ABA’s House 
of Delegates for approval at the Association’s annual meeting in August 2012. I have benefitted from 
discussing the ideas here with Barbara S. Gillers, who teaches legal ethics at NYU and Columbia Law 
Schools. I also thank Carolyn F. Stoner, NYU J.D. Class of 2013, for her excellent research help. Last, 
I am grateful to the D’Agostino/Greenberg Fund for assistance that allowed me to spend time on this 
Article. Of course, I alone am responsible for the content of the Article. 
 1. James McHenry, a Maryland delegate to the Constitutional Convention, recorded the 
following exchange with Benjamin Franklin at the close of the Convention: “A lady asked Dr. 
Franklin, ‘Well Doctor what have we got, a republic or a monarchy?’ ‘A republic,’ replied the Doctor, 
‘if you can keep it.’” Papers of Dr. James McHenry on the Federal Convention of 1787, 11 Am. Hist. 
Rev. 595, 618 (1906); see Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations, Bartleby.com, 
http://www.bartleby.com/73/1593.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). When McHenry’s notes were 
included in 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 app. A, 85 (Max Farrand ed., 1911), a 
footnote stated that the date this anecdote was written is uncertain. 
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“It’s a new world, Golde.” 
—Tevye, Fiddler on the Roof 
Introduction: The End of Lawyers (or Something)? 
To quote Mark Twain on hearing news of his death, recent titles 
announcing the “End of Lawyers,” or the “Death of Big Law,” or the 
“Vanishing of the American Lawyer” may be “grossly exaggerated.”2 
I do not begrudge the authors of these works3 for using metaphors of 
 
 2. In 1897, Twain was living in London where a cousin, Dr. Jim Clemens, fell ill. The 
newspapers, believing Twain was near death, sent reporters to investigate. Twain made his remark 
when the correspondent for the Evening Sun told him that his death had been reported in New York, 
and asked what he should cable in reply. Mark Twain, Mark Twain in Eruption: Hitherto 
Unpublished Pages About Men and Events 252–53 (Bernard De Voto ed., 3d ed. 1940). According 
to one source, he said: “Just say the report of my death has been grossly exaggerated.” 2 Albert 
Bigelow Paine, Mark Twain: A Biography 1039 (1st ed. 1912). 
 3. The works implicitly referenced here are: Thomas D. Morgan, The Vanishing American 
Lawyer (2010); Richard Susskind, The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal 
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demise to describe the state of the legal profession. Provocative titles 
attract curious readers. They are especially helpful on a subject as 
unexciting outside the profession as is this one. And they are only titles 
after all, not analysis. What’s more, they only exaggerate. The symptoms 
tell us that even if the patient is not comatose, it’s running a high fever—
walking pneumonia, perhaps. 
It is nothing new that the American bar changes from one 
generation to the next, even within generations. Lawyers in 1910 would 
be surprised by the world of American law practice circa 1950, 
astonished if a time machine landed them in 1980, and aghast at the 
profession of 2012. Law students graduating from American law schools 
today will, I predict, see greater upheaval in how the bar is regulated and 
who may profit from the law industry than any generation before them. I 
speak not of the content or processes of the law—though I might—but of 
the nature of practice, how lawyers are organized, and the product 
delivered and therefore the inevitable changes to regulation. But change 
is constant. What else is new? 
Much is new, I think, even if it will not work the upheavals that 
these works predict. Developments external to law practice and the 
insular world of lawyer regulation will change the way we practice and 
will marginalize the effectiveness of regulation unless that also changes. 
“Disruptive” is a helpful word to describe these external developments.4 
I do not think the disruptive externalities portend anything like the death 
or end of law, but instead, only a need for reformulation (with the accent 
on “reform”). We err if we forget how adaptable the bar is in fashioning 
new strategies to sell its product and how imaginative it can be when the 
market and other forces create a need for its knowledge, often 
anticipating (if not creating) needs long before clients reach for the 
phone.5 I am not worried about the profession, which will not die, recede, 
or seriously weaken. It will just reorganize, find new products, find new 
ways to deliver old products, and locate new clients. It is already doing 
these things. My purpose is to examine how professional regulation must 
adjust to the disruptive externalities; that is, how it must adjust or slide 
toward irrelevance. 
Courts are the dominant institutional regulator of the bar, 
supplemented (when judges allow) by legislation and agency rules.6 
 
Services (2008); and Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 3. 
 4. I borrow the phrase “disruptive externalities” from Susskind’s phrase “disruptive 
technologies,” technologies being one of the externalities addressed here. See Susskind, supra note 3, 
at 99–100. 
 5. Consider the creation of the trust, which divides legal and beneficial ownership of property. 
See, e.g., Kent Schenkel, Trust Law and the Title-Split: A Beneficial Perspective, 78 UMKC L. Rev. 181, 
181–83 (2009). 
 6. Stephen Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and Ethics 8–10 (9th ed. 2012). 
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Behind the courts are lawyers, who are, depending on the jurisdiction, 
more or less influential in the rulemaking process, but overall, more 
rather than less influential.7 Then, once a rule is debated and adopted, all 
that is left is enforcement. Those with power have decided the issue and 
that is the end of that. 
This is true in a formal sense, but false otherwise. Even a rule that 
may appear wise at adoption can become unrealistic, inefficient, or 
toothless as the world changes but the rule does not.8 And some rules are 
not wise on adoption but are, rather, comfort rules, or often not rules at 
all but suggestions. They have nostalgic appeal, invoking an image of 
how we believe the bar should be, how in our memories or mythology it 
once was, and how in our aspirations it should remain.9 What is 
happening now is that forces outside the institutions of rulemaking and 
the objectives of the rulemakers are changing (or promising to change) 
the way lawyers behave. The changes in behavior may make a lot of 
sense, which is why they are happening.10 But the rules do not always 
change to accommodate the new behavior. Partly this is a phenomenon 
common to much rulemaking. The world changes, the rules and law play 
catch up. If a rule lags too far behind, it becomes ceremonial. We wheel 
it out to punish the unfortunate transgressor whom we manage to catch, 
unaware of the hundreds or thousands of others doing the same. The 
rules will change, I have no doubt of that—but slowly. I am not writing 
for next month or next year.11 I hope I am doing what academics, with no 
constituents to please except perhaps each other, should do: that is, to 
imagine reforms before it is politically feasible to adopt them. 
Much has been written about the constitutionality of rules 
regulating who may practice law and where.12 Some of the harsher 
exclusionary rules have been struck down under one or another 
constitutional provision. These have concerned the clash between state 
unauthorized practice rules and federal law,13 rules excluding out-of-state 
 
 7. Id. at 9–10. 
 8. Consider, for example, the rule on fee splitting, which went through several iterations from 
restrictive to liberal, eventually coming to reflect what lawyers were doing anyway. Id. at 208–09. 
 9. So-called “aspirational rules” are in this category. The Ethical Considerations in the ABA’s 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility are one example: “The Ethical Considerations are 
aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession 
should strive.” Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility Preamble and Preliminary Statement (1980). 
Aspirational rules encourage a level of conduct but do not purport to bind anyone. 
 10. Cross-border practice may be the most dramatic example. See infra text accompanying notes 
16–31. 
 11. And needless perhaps to add, since my prescriptions are for the long haul, nothing I say is 
meant to suggest that whatever slower pace the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 or the ABA House 
of Delegates now elects therefore falls short. 
 12. See, e.g., Andrew M. Perlman, A Bar Against Competition: The Unconstitutionality of 
Admission Rules for Out-of-State Lawyers, 18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 135 (2004). 
 13. See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 400–01 (1963) (holding that state 
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residents from a jurisdiction’s bar,14 and rules allowing a state’s residents 
to gain easier bar admission than could out-of-state residents.15 Perhaps 
we have reached the end of the line, at least for the immediate term, for 
whatever the Constitution has to say on the topic. Perhaps not. My focus, 
however, is policy, not law. What makes sense for the new world 
described here? How can we best move willingly from the nineteenth-
century ideology of regulation to the twenty-first century’s reality of 
practice while embracing the American bar’s traditional values? 
I.  An Illusion of Control Is Not Good 
in Lawyer Regulation 
There could hardly be a better example of the disjuncture between 
rule and behavior than what has come to be known as multijurisdictional 
practice, which is another way of saying that in working for clients 
lawyers travel outside the jurisdiction that licenses them. Looked at one 
way, as courts sometimes have, traveling lawyers are not lawyers when 
they cross a state or a national border.16 Every so often, a lawyer would 
get into a dispute with a client, who would then refuse to pay the lawyer, 
claiming that the lawyer was practicing law where she was not authorized 
to do so. (“Where” is a key word, as we shall see.) This was a rare 
occurrence, but when it happened, a court might agree with the client.17 
The quality of the lawyer’s work was irrelevant.18 The courts purported to 
enforce a public policy in denying a fee.19 The client’s knowledge of the 
 
power to regulate the bar was subordinate under the Supremacy Clause to federal law allowing lay 
representation in the U.S. patent office); Nat’l Revenue Corp. v. Violet, 807 F.2d 285, 290 (1st Cir. 
1986) (concluding that state law limiting debt collection to licensed lawyers violated the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution). 
 14. Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 288–89 (1984) (ruling that New Hampshire could not 
prevent a Vermont citizen from gaining admission to its bar after taking its state bar examination); see 
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 (1973) (holding that Connecticut could not limit bar admission to U.S. 
citizens). 
 15. Supreme Court v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59, 59 (1988) (ruling that the state could not limit 
admission by motion to state residents). 
 16. See, e.g., In re Jackman, 761 A.2d 1103, 1103–04 (N.J. 2000) (delaying consideration of 
admission to the New Jersey bar of a Massachusetts lawyer who practiced law for seven years in New 
Jersey without authorization). 
 17. See, e.g., Ranta v. McCarney, 391 N.W.2d 161, 166 (N.D. 1986) (holding that a Minnesota 
lawyer could not recover fees for federal tax advice given to a North Dakota client while the lawyer 
was in North Dakota, but could recover fees for such advice given while the lawyer was in Minnesota). 
The lawyer in Ranta had a more extensive North Dakota practice than the single client whose work 
was the subject of the case. The court cited his “long-term unauthorized practice in this State, his 
involvement with many other area clients, and his opening a branch office in Bismarck.” Id. at 165. 
However, the court’s holding did not rest on this factor. 
 18. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1998). 
In this case, the client had sued for malpractice and the law firm counterclaimed for its fee. Without 
deciding the malpractice claim, the court denied the fee for work performed by New York lawyers 
“in” California. See infra text accompanying notes 22–24. 
 19. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 11. 
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lawyer’s jurisdictional limitations was also irrelevant because clients 
could not consent to a violation of public policy.20 Despite these rare 
decisions, there is no evidence that lawyers stopped getting in planes, 
trains, and cars to cross state and national borders. One time in a million 
(or in a very large number) a lawyer might get caught and lose all or part 
of her fee.21 We have lived with the discrepancy between the way people 
actually behaved—because it made sense to behave that way and because 
it was efficient, beneficial, and respected the autonomy of lawyers and 
clients—and the occasional victim of ambiguous unauthorized practice 
rules. Odds were high that you would not be one of those victims. 
And then came a victim whose plight garnered broad attention and 
galvanized the bar to update its rules. In Birbrower, Montalbano, 
Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court 
denied a New York law firm any fee for work its lawyers did for a 
California company on an impending California arbitration (which never 
occurred) when the work was performed physically in California (the 
lawyers traveled there three times for a few days each time) and when 
the work was done physically in New York but “virtually” in California 
by email, fax, or phone.22 The court described the lawyer’s work “in” 
California as “extensive,” citing the trips, the fact that the client was a 
California company, and the fact that the arbitration would occur in the 
state under California law.23 (“In” is also a key word in the world of 
unauthorized practice.) The court did not say whether any single factor 
was decisive or identify their relative weights, making planning nearly 
impossible. But the court also said that the very same work, even the 
lawyers’ advice on California law, could be compensated if done while 
the lawyers were physically in New York and not “virtually” in 
California.24 
The Birbrower decision, by focusing on the physical or virtual 
location of the lawyers, was so misguided, and so unclear in explaining 
when the nexus with California was great enough for the work to be 
deemed “in” California and therefore the unauthorized practice of law, 
that it had to be quickly undone. Lawyers were spurred into action 
because here was a living casualty of a dated idea and even more so 
because other lawyers could easily see themselves in the same 
predicament. The California Supreme Court had elsewhere been 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Indeed, it is in fee disputes that the rule is mainly enforced. Absent egregious behavior, 
disciplinary authorities have not been much interested in fencing out transient lawyers. For examples 
of egregious cases, see Stephen Gillers, Lessons from the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission: The 
Art of Making Change, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 685, 683–85 (2002). 
 22. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 2–4. I analyzed this opinion and the reaction to it in Gillers, supra note 21. 
 23. In addition, the lawyer’s fee agreement with the client was governed by California law. 
Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 2. 
 24. Id. at 5–6. 
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enlightened about modern practice25—and if it could happen there, it 
could happen anywhere. 
In the ensuing years, even California courts read Birbrower narrowly, 
as did other courts. Some courts declined to extend it or rejected it.26 The 
Ninth Circuit used the phrase “judicial Luddites” in rejecting the 
Birbrower understanding of “modern law practice.”27 Prodded by the 
legislature, a California Supreme Court committee set about rewriting 
the rules on cross-border practice to recognize what had been true for 
decades—what lawyers assumed the rules already allowed and what no 
rule was going to stop because cross-border work reflected the judgments 
of reasonable clients and lawyers about what was in their interest to do.28 
So the state’s rules were forced to catch up.29 The ABA did the same with 
its rules.30 Without Birbrower, we might still be living with the wide gulf 
 
 25. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal Rptr. 2d 1, 3–4 (Ct. App. 1994) 
(recognizing an employed lawyer’s right to sue a corporate client for retaliatory discharge). 
 26. Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 815, 820–21 (9th Cir. 2009) (recognizing 
the economic realities of modern law practice); Estate of Condon, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 927–29 (Ct. 
App. 1998) (declining to extend Birbrower, the court wrote, “In the real world of 1998 we do not live 
or do business in isolation within strict geopolitical boundaries. Social interaction and the conduct of 
business transcends state and national boundaries; it is truly global.”).  
 27. The Winterrowd court explained: 
  Even at a time when the largest law firms in the United States were composed of not 
many more than one hundred lawyers, Judge Friendly observed that we live in an “age of 
increased specialization and high mobility of the bar.” Spanos v. Skouras, 364 F.2d 161, 170 
(2d Cir. 1966). But in 1966, there were no personal computers, no Internet, no Blackberries, 
no teleconferencing, no emails, and the only person who had a two-way wrist radio was 
cartoon character Dick Tracy. Today, largely because of the benefits of modern technology, 
hundreds of U.S.-based law firms are composed of many hundreds, or even thousands, of 
lawyers and support personnel contemporaneously doing business in many states and 
throughout the world. Lawyers throughout the United States regularly participate in 
teleconferences and group email sessions with other lawyers in other states, and lawyers and 
paralegals from one or more firms participate in massive discovery projects arising out of a 
single case concerning papers and data located in several states. In many such instances, 
only a small fraction of the lawyers involved in a case are members of the bar of the state 
where the presiding court sits. Current law does not compel us to be judicial Luddites, and 
we may properly accommodate many of the realities of modern law practice, while still 
securing to federal courts the ability to control and discipline those who practice before 
them. 
556 F.3d at 819–20. Another holding of Birbrower—that an appearance in arbitration is the practice of 
law within the meaning of the unauthorized practice rules— also has been rejected. See infra text 
accompanying notes 125–130. 
 28. ABA, Report of the Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice 2–3 (2002), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/intro_cover.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 29. Cal. R. Ct. 9.43–9.48. 
 30. The ABA amended its Model Rules of Professional Conduct to create “safe harbors” for 
cross-border practice in Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5 (2011). As of 2011, forty-five U.S. 
jurisdictions have adopted this rule in substantially similar or identical form. ABA, State 
Implementation of ABA Model Rule 5.5 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/quick_guide_5_5.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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between rule and reality.31  
The old rules depended on the illusion (even self-deception) that 
rules rule, full stop. They operated from the complacent assumption that 
behavior will conform to rules. The new California and ABA rules were 
adopted to conform rules to behavior. The lesson from this experience is 
that lawyers in their bar groups and judges in their chambers cannot 
write rules that stray far from the rational choices of lawyers and clients 
and expect obedience to what they demand. 
There is a lesson behind this lesson, which will be the main theme of 
this Article. Once upon a time, lawyers worked at a desk. The desk was 
in a place (a state) and the government of that state (via the courts 
granting a license) validated the lawyer’s presence at that desk in that 
state. Without validation there was no lawyer and no desk. The license 
stopped at the border of the state. Geography as an organizing principle 
for regulation worked well enough until the final quarter of the twentieth 
century. Its benefits were apparent: If lawyers stayed put, if their clients 
came from the state that licensed them, if their firms had one office, if 
physical travel to other places was the exception, and virtual travel 
limited to telephone and telex, then defining the license by the 
geographical boundary of the state that granted it made sense; or at least 
it didn’t create inconvenience and widespread disobedience. The 
licensing regime was not driven by a wish to keep other lawyers out 
because those lawyers worked at their own desks in their own states and 
also stayed put. In a sense, each jurisdiction was a cocoon. The salutary 
purpose of licensing was (and still is) to ensure the competence and 
integrity of home-state lawyers. However, even in this simpler time, some 
states erected formidable barriers to discourage lawyers from relocating. 
Among those barriers were durational residency requirements. These 
baldly anticompetitive rules, which prevented a relocating lawyer from 
gaining admission to a state’s bar, whether on motion or by examination, 
until she had resided in the state for a set period of time, were eventually 
struck down.32 
 
 31. New York still lives with that gulf. As I know from my service on it, the commission that 
proposed the amendments to the Model Rules to allow cross-border practice worried that small states, 
especially small states near big cities (like New Hampshire and New Jersey), would reject the rules for 
fear that big-state lawyers would cherry pick the best matters that would otherwise go to lawyers in the 
small states. Presumptively, predatory New York lawyers were prominent in this worry. As it turns 
out, New York rejected the new rules. One participant in the meeting with the New York judges who 
made this decision told me that one judge who opposed the rules asked rhetorically how he could 
defend letting a lawyer from Vermont take business from a lawyer in New York. 
 32. See, e.g., Keenan v. Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1351 (D.C.N.C. 1970) (holding 
that one-year residence requirement to take the state bar violates the constitutional right to travel). A 
modern vestige of such barriers is the requirement that lawyers from one jurisdiction, no matter how 
experienced, take the bar examination in a jurisdiction to which they relocate. Thirteen American 
states impose this requirement. Others permit motion admission. See Nat’l Conference of Bar 
Examiners & ABA Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, Comprehensive Guide to Bar 
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Geography, or place, remains the governing principle as a formal 
matter—it still animates many of the rules regulating lawyers—but at the 
expense of a widening gap between those rules and the conduct of the 
bar. Three forces have undermined the idea of a licensing authority 
coterminous with a jurisdiction’s physical border. First, technology does 
not recognize borders. Second, physical travel is easy if not always 
pleasant. Third, clients’ needs increasingly cross borders as they also take 
advantage of technology and easier travel. These changes, which will 
only become more prominent, mean that we require a new (or 
additional) governing principle beyond geography. 
We should not have needed Birbrower to spur us to revise our rules 
on cross-border practice. The inadequacy of physical place as an 
organizing principle was long apparent. We should have seen that the 
conduct the old California rules were held to prohibit (and that similar 
rules elsewhere could then have been held to prohibit) did not pose a 
risk to the public or clients that justified the state’s closed door policy 
and its impediment to rational economic activity. We should have revised 
those misguided rules earlier, as we partly did thereafter, to sensibly 
reconcile the competing interests, which is the purpose of regulation in 
the first place. We should do the same today for other rules to take 
account of expanding technology and the cross-border needs of clients, 
while preserving the good things that regulation offers. What exactly are 
those good things? We need to know in order to identify what we do 
next. 
II.  What Do We Get for All of Our Lawyer Regulation? 
Dense and detailed though the world of lawyer regulation is, the 
rules fall into two neat categories: Rules that determine who can be a 
lawyer and rules that determine how lawyers may, must, or must not 
behave. 
A. Who Can Be a Lawyer? 
There are three rules in this category: One rule specifies an 
educational requirement,33 a second describes an examination 
requirement,34 and a third has a character requirement.35 A person who 
wants to practice law in a place must satisfy all three rules unless 
excused.36 What constitutes the practice of law, as opposed to the practice 
 
Admission Requirements 2011, at 35 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/migrated/legaled/publications/20110201_Comp_Guide.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 33. See, e.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, §§ 520.3–520.6 (2011). 
 34. Id. §§ 520.8–520.9. 
 35. Id. § 520.12. 
 36. Many states also have rules allowing lawyers to gain admission to the bar on motion, without 
taking an examination, if the lawyers have practiced for a defined period of time. See, e.g., id. § 520.10. 
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of something else that may resemble law or that a person who is not a 
lawyer may do along with lawyers, is a different debate. Efforts have 
been made to define the practice of law. They have not been satisfying.37 
1. Education  
In American history there was a time that no education, at least no 
formal education, was required for law practice.38 One could hang out a 
shingle, possibly after a law office apprenticeship. That remains true in 
some jurisdictions.39 In reality, however, new lawyers will have gone to 
law school for three years, after four years of college, and for most 
jurisdictions that law school will be approved by the American Bar 
Association.40 Today, the rules of most courts require graduation from an 
ABA-approved law school, though with exceptions.41 
What does this requirement get us? It ensures that new lawyers have 
reached an age of presumptive maturity because they will have had seven 
years of postsecondary education. More important, it means that new 
lawyers will have had a rigorous and demanding intellectual experience—
a benefit of the ABA’s Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of 
 
 37. See, e.g., Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 81.101 (West 2011), which provides in part: 
(a) In this chapter the “practice of law” means the preparation of a pleading or other 
document incident to an action or special proceeding or the management of the action or 
proceeding on behalf of a client before a judge in court as well as a service rendered out of 
court, including the giving of advice or the rendering of any service requiring the use of legal 
skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract, or other instrument, the legal effect of 
which under the facts and conclusions involved must be carefully determined. 
(b) The definition in this section is not exclusive and does not deprive the judicial branch of 
the power and authority under both this chapter and the adjudicated cases to determine 
whether other services and acts not enumerated may constitute the practice of law. 
 38. Perlman, supra note 12, at 145. 
 39. California, for example, permits a person to qualify to take the bar through study in a judge’s 
chambers or a law office for four years. Cal. State Bar R. 4.26 provides: 
General applicants for the California Bar Examination must 
(A) have received a juris doctor (J.D.) or bachelor of laws (LL.B) degree from a law school 
approved by the American Bar Association or accredited by the Committee; or 
(B) demonstrate that in accordance with these rules and the requirements of Business & 
Professions Code §6060(e)(2) they have 
 (1) studied law diligently and in good faith for at least four years in a law school 
registered with the Committee; in a law office; in a judge’s chambers; or by some 
combination of these methods; or 
 (2) met the requirements of these rules for legal education in a foreign state or country; and 
(C) have passed or established exemption from the First-Year Law Students’ Examination. 
 40. See the detailed information collected by the ABA Section of Legal Education and 
Admission to the Bar at Legal Education Statistics from ABA-Approved Law Schools, ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 41. A few jurisdictions, including California and Massachusetts, permit graduates of law schools 
that are not approved by the ABA to take their bar examinations. See, e.g., Cal. State Bar R. 4.27; 
Mass. Sup. Judicial Ct. R. 3:01, § 3.1.3. 
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Law Schools42—focused on legal rules and legal reasoning. They will 
have learned the particular way that lawyers think. But beyond styles of 
thought, they also will have learned the law: the basic law taught in 
required courses43 and the law of any other subjects they may elect to 
take, among which will often be courses that once were required.44 
2. The Bar Examination  
The bar examination is meant to complement the educational 
requirement. We can question its purpose. At one time, and still to some 
extent, it tested the applicant’s knowledge of the law of the particular 
place from which she wished to get a license to practice law.45 The 
examination requirement necessarily implies that a state cannot 
confidently defer to the fact of graduation from a law school, even an 
ABA-approved law school, to conclude that all applicants have the 
intellect and knowledge required for law practice in the jurisdiction.46 
 
 42. ABA Section of Legal Educ. & Admissions to the Bar, 2011–2012 Standards and Rules 
of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools (2012) [hereinafter ABA Standards]. 
 43. While the identity of the required courses will vary by school, the core curriculum remains 
generally unchanged: contracts, torts, property, criminal law, constitutional law, and civil procedure. 
The ABA’s Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools are modest in their 
description of the required content of a legal education. Standard 302(a), id. at 20, states the content 
requirement: 
(a) A law school shall require that each student receive substantial instruction in: 
(1) the substantive law generally regarded as necessary to effective and responsible 
participation in the legal profession; 
(2) legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem solving, and oral communication; 
(3) writing in a legal context, including at least one rigorous writing experience in the first 
year and at least one additional rigorous writing experience after the first year; 
(4) other professional skills generally regarded as necessary for effective and responsible 
participation in the legal profession; and 
(5) the history, goals, structure, values, rules and responsibilities of the legal profession and 
its members. 
 44. For example, although corporations and evidence are not required classes, in my law school, a 
large majority of students take each. 
 45. For example, the first day of the Missouri bar examination consists of a combination of the 
Multistate Essay Examination prepared by the National Conference of Bar Examiners and essay 
questions prepared by the Missouri Board of Law Examiners. Rule 8.08 of the Rules Governing 
Admission to the Bar in Missouri provides: 
The essay questions may cover all or some of the following subject matters: agency and 
partnership, corporations and limited liability companies (LLCs), conflicts of law, estates, 
family law, federal civil procedure, trusts and future interests, sales, commercial paper, 
secured transactions, constitutional law, contracts, criminal law and procedure, evidence, 
real property, torts, administrative law, remedies, and Missouri civil procedure. 
Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 8.08. All essay questions must be answered according to Missouri law. Id. 
 46. This is an inescapable inference from the fact that states require both graduation from law 
school and bar examination passage. See, e.g., Fla. Bar R. 1.15.1 (“The primary purpose of the bar 
examination is to ensure that all who are admitted to The Florida Bar have demonstrated minimum 
technical competence.”). Florida also requires graduation from an ABA-approved law school. Fla. 
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The number of graduates the examination excludes, even after multiple 
tries, is comparatively small.47 We might also question whether how one 
performs on a multiday examination under significant pressure predicts 
how she will perform in the rather different milieu of law practice. We 
might assume that success in a law school—at least measured by the fact 
of graduation—is a better predictor. Or if not, if a state fears that law 
schools might set the graduation bar too low, a higher measure of law 
school success (a certain grade point average, for example) might be used 
to obviate further testing for those who meet it. Perhaps this would not 
work, however, because standards may vary across schools, which might 
actually then compete to graduate the greatest number of students 
exempt from the examination and thereby raise the yield for the entering 
classes. 
The second assumption behind the bar examination is that it is 
necessary to test the applicant’s knowledge of the law of the jurisdiction 
from which she seeks a license.48 Applicants go to law school nationwide 
but seek a law license in a particular place. That place may wish to assure 
itself, before it allows the applicant to have local clients, that she knows 
the law of the place. This can lead to minute questions about the law of 
the place, such as: the number of witnesses required for a will and who 
they must not be; the grounds for divorce and annulment; the scope of 
the statement against interest hearsay exception; the exceptions to the 
lawyer’s duty of confidentiality; when the statute of limitations is tolled 
in a medical malpractice case; whether a deed has to be acknowledged 
and how; and the difference between first and second degree 
manslaughter.49 Put aside the fact that the answers to all such questions 
can be found quickly when the need for them arises. Put aside the fact 
that these questions test the applicant’s memory, which will be quickly 
 
Board of Bar Examiners, http://www.floridabarexam.org/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 47. Nationwide, in 2010 eighty-one percent of graduates of ABA-approved schools passed the bar 
examination the first time and forty-one percent of repeaters passed. 2010 First-Time Exam Takers 
and Repeaters from ABA-Approved Law Schools, Bar Examiner, Mar. 2011, at 19. 
 48. This is apparent in the Missouri rule specifying that essay questions on the Missouri bar 
examination, even those on the Multistate Essay Examination, must be answered under Missouri law. 
See Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 8.08. Missouri was the first state to adopt the uniform bar examination, but that 
adoption will not prevent it from testing on state law. Other states that have adopted the Multistate 
Essay Examination do not use it to test state law but rather use the “general principles” in the model 
answers developed by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, the creator of the Multistate Essay 
Examination. These jurisdictions may also test local law in separate essays. See, e.g., Ala. Bar. R. VI. 
 49. These questions are all hypothetical, but they describe the kind of microlocal law inquiry a 
test taker might expect to encounter. For example, the California State Bar website identifies the 
following subjects on which applicants should prepare to be tested: the effect of the death of a married 
person on their community and quasi-community property; the provisions of the probate code dealing 
with simultaneous death; and “[t]hose provisions of Article 9 concerning Fixtures.” Scope of the 
California Bar Examination: General Bar Examination and Attorneys’ Examination, State Bar of 
Cal. Comm. of Bar Examiners/Office of Admissions, http://admissions.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx? 
fileticket=VQF73Jr-8iE%3d&tabid=245 (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
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emptied when the test is over.50 Put aside the fact that lawyers then in 
practice in the testing state will rarely know the answers to these 
questions without research, unless they concentrate in the particular area 
of law. And put aside the fact that many applicants may never again need 
to know the answers to most or all of these questions because they will 
practice, for example, antitrust law or intellectual property law. 
The necessary premise behind testing local law knowledge is that 
the local law is sufficiently different from the law elsewhere such that an 
examination is needed to ensure that the applicant knows it, if only for 
the days of the examination. For if the law of the place is not so different 
(and if memory for small bits of information is a questionable indicator 
of competence to practice law), then the justification for the bar 
examination is a generic one—that is, to test the applicant’s legal 
reasoning, her ability to interpret rules and to apply them to particular 
facts, and her knowledge of the constitutional limitations on government 
power. 
While an applicant should be expected to know that there is a 
difference between manslaughter and murder and the nature of that 
difference, it should give us no assurance of competence that the 
applicant has managed, with the benefit of an intense, two month, fact-
stuffing bar preparation class, to remember the precise elements of 
second degree manslaughter in the testing jurisdiction. The advent of 
multistate bar examinations that are not state law specific,51 and the 
incipient interest in a single uniform bar examination,52 may reflect 
increasing state recognition that testing temporary memory of the 
minutiae of local law is not a useful predictor of competence. Or it may 
 
 50. A California lawyer told me that her bar review class helped students recall all state felonies 
with an acronym, each letter of which identified a different felony. Now, thirty years later, she still 
recalled part of it, Mr. and Mrs. Lamb, though not what each letter signified. 
 51. The various multistate examinations and the state adoptions can be found at the website for 
the National Conference of Bar Examiners. See Multistate Tests, Nat’l Conference of Bar 
Examiners, http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests (last visited Mar. 17, 2012); NCBE Testing Services, 
Nat’l Conference of Bar Examiners (Dec. 27, 2011), http://www.ncbex.org/assets/media_files/ 
Multistate-Tests/2011NCBETesting-Services-including-UBE-jurisdictions122711.pdf. 
 52. The ABA reported on January 28, 2010: 
A recent resurgence of interest in a potential national uniform bar exam has sparked debate 
in the legal community among practitioners, jurists, law students, and bar examiners. 
As many as 32 states are reportedly considering changing their existing exam requirements 
to a uniform national examination. 
Tiffany M. Williams, Examining the Feasibility of a National Uniform Bar Exam, ABA Litig. News 
(Jan. 28, 2010), http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/national-bar-exam.html.  
A uniform bar examination would not necessarily eliminate testing in local law. A state would be 
free to supplement its examination with a local law test. See Essays on a Uniform Bar Examination, 
Bar Examiner, Feb. 2009, at 6 (discussing this question). The Bar Examiner is published by the 
National Conference of Bar Examiners, which has developed the uniform bar examination. See The 
Uniform Bar Examination, Nat’l Conference of Bar Examiners, http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-
tests/ube/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
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instead (or also) reflect a preference for the administrative convenience 
and financial savings of assigning the development and scoring of bar 
examinations to an outside organization. 
Claims that the bar examination is required to ensure that a law 
school has done its job to the state’s satisfaction and that the applicant 
knows the law of the place from which she seeks a license are challenged 
by the way many states treat relocating lawyers. A lawyer who has 
practiced in one place may wish to move to another. A salutary rule in 
many places permits motion admission, which will grant a license without 
the need to take the jurisdiction’s bar examination if the applicant has 
practiced law elsewhere for a designated number of years.53 But in some 
states even seasoned lawyers must take the bar examination (or an 
abbreviated version of it) alongside new graduates.54 That includes 
lawyers who have successfully practiced elsewhere, who have letters 
commending their legal skill, and who work in an area of federal law and 
have little interest in the law of the place to which they move. A 
suspicious person might wonder whether the examination requirement is 
intended to dissuade entry, just as durational residency requirements 
once did.55 The examination is not here needed to ensure that the 
applicant’s law school did not graduate a dud. Differences in the law of 
the new place from the law of the old place can be the only defensible 
justification for the requirement and that justification dissolves if the law 
is not (so) different, if the differences are irrelevant to the migrating 
lawyer’s practice, if the state does not test local law on its examination, or 
if the differences can be quickly ascertained. (“I practice securities law. 
Why do I have to memorize the elements of assault? And if I ever do 
need to know them, I’ll open a book.”). 
3. Character Committees  
The final hurdle to bar admission is the character committee. These 
committees have a troubling history. At one time, they excluded 
applicants for reasons having nothing to do with what can reasonably be 
called character, let alone a rational prediction of an applicant’s behavior 
if admitted. Bias probably explains some decisions.56 Committees also 
excluded applicants who were in intimate relationships but not married.57 
 
 53. For states with such rules and the variations among them, see ABA, Admission by Motion 
Rules (Dec. 9, 2009). 
 54. According to the ABA, eleven states do not recognize admission on motion for lawyers who 
have been admitted to practice in another U.S. jurisdiction. Id. 
 55. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
 56. See Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern 
America 94–101 (1976). 
 57. Cord v. Gibb, 254 S.E.2d 71, 73 (Va. 1979) (rejecting the lower court’s decision to deny 
admission to the bar to a woman living with a man to whom she was not married). 
Gillers_22 (F. Valdez) (Do Not Delete) 4/19/2012  6:17 PM 
968 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:953 
They excluded gay men and lesbians.58 They assumed the power to 
exclude applicants based on disloyalty to the U.S. and state 
constitutions,59 or based on personality disorders.60 Sometimes these 
disorders were associated with particular ethnic or religious groups.61 
Today, character committees might better be called conduct 
committees. What they try to determine is whether conduct in the life of 
the applicant predicts that she will act dishonorably as a lawyer: that is, 
will break the rules that govern law practice and thereby harm clients 
and the justice system. Committees have been criticized even when their 
investigations are so limited.62 Are these predictions reliable? Are they 
reliable enough to justify exclusion or delay in admission? What can we 
say about future behavior from the fact that an applicant shoplifted a 
sweater while in college, or shared a controlled substance with friends, or 
failed to pay a dozen parking tickets, or cheated on a metaphysics exam, 
or even a law school evidence exam, and got an F? On the other hand, if 
the conduct is disreputable enough, if it reveals disregard of the law or 
breach of trust for self-advantage, who should bear the risk that the 
prediction will be wrong? A strong argument can be made that the state 
should not be required to give a seal of approval to an applicant who, for 
example, has betrayed others or who broke the law for personal gain, 
and who if admitted will hang the state’s license on her office wall to 
induce trust from clients. 
The new world I will describe, with its disruptive externalities, 
envisions a role for character committees, the same circumscribed role as 
today. Whatever the justification for these committees—and I think they 
are justified if their focus is narrow—the disruptive externalities do not 
displace them. Indeed, a state to which a practicing lawyer relocates has a 
heightened claim to a character (or conduct) inquiry because the lawyer 
admitted elsewhere will have had more time to misbehave, including in 
practice, compared to the new graduate. A jurisdiction may wish to 
weigh the fact that a relocating lawyer has been disciplined or found 
 
 58. State ex rel. Fla. Bar v. Kimball, 96 So. 2d 825, 825 (Fla. 1957). 
 59. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 156–57 (1971). 
An applicant to the New York bar was required to “take an oath that he will support the Constitutions 
of the United States and of the State of New York.” Id. at 157. Although the plaintiffs could cite no 
case in which “any applicant has ever been unjustifiably denied permission to practice law” under this 
requirement, they claimed that “New York’s system by its very existence works a ‘chilling effect’ upon 
the free exercise of the rights of speech and association of students who must anticipate having to meet 
its requirements.” Id. at 158–59. 
 60. See generally Clark v. Va. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1995) (canvassing 
the history of these inquiries). 
 61. Auerbach, supra note 56, at 99–101. 
 62. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 Yale L.J. 
491 (1985). 
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civilly liable for a breach of fiduciary duty even if the underlying conduct 
has not led to the loss or even suspension of her license. 
B. The Rules Governing Lawyers 
So far, I have identified rules that control entry into a jurisdiction’s 
legal profession. Separate and exponentially more complicated sources 
govern the conduct of the admitted lawyer. These include cases that 
define legal malpractice and breach of duty as a fiduciary (which a lawyer 
is63), ethical or professional conduct rules under various names, and 
legislation and case law that control how law is practiced. These rules fall 
into two categories, one of which most concerns me. The first category 
describes the lawyer’s relationship to specific others: their clients and 
former clients, courts and other tribunals, opposing lawyers and clients, 
other third persons, and (modestly) the jurisdiction’s justice system.64 The 
rules in the second category, the focus here, address how the law 
marketplace is organized and how it sells its product. They answer such 
questions as who may trade in legal services in the jurisdiction; what the 
word “in” means in an age of virtual communication;65 when law practice 
is unauthorized;66 how a law office may and may not be organized;67 and 
who may profit from, own, and manage a law firm.68 In short, these rules 
define the legal marketplace by tightly controlling the organization and 
operation of the supply side—the producers of the service and who may 
earn money from it. 
The rules in this second category, like those in the first, are justified 
by the need to ensure competence and honesty. To some extent they do 
so, although often less directly, by purporting to diminish the risk of 
improper influence from lay interests and the risk of error by persons not 
trained in the law of the jurisdiction. They may do these things by 
closing, so far as possible, a jurisdiction’s law business to lawyers from 
outside the jurisdiction’s borders and to nonlawyers from anywhere. The 
closure is not airtight, but serious enough to create impediments to cross-
 
 63. In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (N.Y. 1994). 
 64. In this category are, for example, rules on confidentiality, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct R. 1.6 (2010); rules on conflicts of interest, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7–.12 
(2010); and rules on duty to tribunals, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.1-.4 (2010). 
 65. The word “in” challenged the Birbrower court, which recognized that its holding would 
depend directly on the elasticity of that preposition. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. 
Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 5–6 (Cal. 1998). 
 66. See, e.g., Prof’l Adjustors, Inc. v. Tandon, 433 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ind. 1982) (invalidating a 
legislative scheme that created licensed insurance adjustors because the work they were authorized to 
do for individuals with claims against insurance carriers entailed interpretation of contracts and 
negotiation deemed the practice of law). 
 67. Law firms may be partnerships, limited liability partnerships, or professional corporations. 
See, e.g., Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers § 9 cmt. b (2000). 
 68. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4 (2010), in force in every jurisdiction but Washington, 
D.C. forbids nonlawyers from having an ownership interest in or managing a law firm. 
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border practice and nonlawyer competition. Failure to evaluate whether 
these barriers are needed, whether they should be as high as they are, 
and whether their goals may be achieved without the same level of 
exclusion invites benign civil disobedience—that is, lawyers, firms, 
clients, and others behave in ways that they reasonably see as efficient 
and rational even if (sometimes vaguely) forbidden. As in Birbrower, one 
lawyer in ten thousand may be unlucky enough to face sanction for 
transgressing these rules, but as in Birbrower, that will not stop much of 
the behavior. People act according to what they assume sensible rules 
should allow and therefore (they assume) do allow. In good faith, they 
may conclude incorrectly that their conduct is permitted. The Birbrower 
lawyers likely believed that they were operating on the safe side of any 
unauthorized practice line. That there was even an issue may never have 
occurred to them. I believe that most American lawyers would have 
agreed that the conduct was proper and certainly did not constitute the 
“extensive” practice of law “in” California, including virtually from New 
York.69 That widespread agreement is what made the decision so 
shocking and set in motion an effort to upend it.70 
Of course, the rules in this second category have long created 
barriers to out-of-state lawyers, but they were not so inconvenient until 
recently. What has changed is the perception that today, because of 
technology and client needs indifferent to borders, the second category’s 
rules dramatically impede the efficient delivery of legal services by 
lawyers without a countervailing benefit.71 The disruptive and extralegal 
externalities described in Part IV below encourage that perception. (By 
“extralegal” I mean only that they are external to the rulemaking 
universe, not that they are unlawful.) Separately, the second category’s 
rules also impede—indeed categorically forbid—participation in the 
ownership or management of law firms by persons who are not lawyers 
anywhere72—in other words, nonlawyers, which is the name lawyers give 
 
 69. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 7. 
 70. See supra text accompanying notes 24–31. 
 71. See, e.g., Winterrowd v. Am. Gen. Annuity Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 815, 819–20 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 72. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4 (2010). Only Washington, D.C. has exceptions to 
this exclusion. D.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4(b) (2007) provides: 
A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of organization in which a 
financial interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an individual nonlawyer 
who performs professional services which assist the organization in providing legal services 
to clients, but only if: 
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose providing legal services to clients; 
(2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding a financial interest undertake 
to abide by these Rules of Professional Conduct; 
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in the partnership or 
organization undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer participants to the same extent 
as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rule 5.1; 
(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing. 
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to the rest of the world. And this exclusion also affects the market for 
legal advice and therefore its cost. But here, too, disruptive externalities 
are challenging these exclusionary rules or, in any event, are making 
them much harder to enforce. 
While I appreciate the value of “end is near” tropes in book titles, I 
do not join the chorus nor characterize as terminal the effect on the legal 
profession of technology and the growth in cross-border commerce. My 
purpose is different. We do not need to define the level of threat to 
recognize that there are threats (or, if you will, opportunities). The 
question I ask is how the regulatory framework should be altered to 
accommodate the forces of change while protecting what is precious in 
the lawyers’ world, our core values and especially the assurance of our 
clients’ trust. My thesis is that these forces cannot be stopped, though 
they can be slowed and they can be pushed underground. Rules refusing 
to recognize the conduct these forces encourage may lead to sanctions 
against the occasional lawyer or nonlawyer who is snared in the high 
beam of a regulator’s patrol car. But many others will speed along on 
back roads undetected. That is not healthy for the law or the nation. 
III.  Disruptive Externalities 
By disruptive externalities I mean real-world developments that 
exert pressure on the traditional regulatory model. Some developments 
may be outside the traditional power of the regulator’s authority or 
impossible to police effectively. One example is computer programs that 
dispense legal advice to consumers.73 Two other examples of conduct that 
defy effective regulation are virtual cross-border advice74 and legal 
process outsourcing (“LPO”).75 Alternatively, a development may be 
compliant with existing regulations, or even promoted by them, but 
inspire unanticipated changes. An example is the incipient move toward 
a uniform bar examination,76 which may make it difficult to resist 
movement toward a national, or at least a multistate, law license. Yet 
other examples are the increasing move toward uniformity in legal rules 
across U.S. jurisdictions, with differences modest and easy to discover; 
the fact that federal law, which is the same everywhere, is pervasive; and 
the fact that U.S. law and the law of many nations is available to anyone, 
anywhere, with a computer terminal and a subscription to Lexis or 
Westlaw. 
These developments and others can be sliced, diced, and 
recombined in various ways. Whatever the organization, however, the 
 
 73. See infra text accompanying notes 118–124. 
 74. See infra text accompanying notes 102–110. 
 75. See infra text accompanying notes 131–142. 
 76. See supra text accompanying notes 48–52. 
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lesson, I contend, is the same: The nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
regulatory models will buckle under the weight of the twenty-first 
century’s innovations. Buckle, not collapse, but still no longer fully 
serviceable. Comparison to print media helps explain some of the 
disruption. What print media—newspapers and magazines—sell is 
information (fact and opinion) and little else. The effect of technology on 
the media’s business model is by now well known, although solutions 
remain elusive.77 How can the media generate the required revenue from 
subscriptions and advertisements when a consumer no longer needs to 
buy a hard-copy publication and when online competition is offering 
commodity news (in other words, news everyone has, like what the 
President said yesterday) or “news” that exploits the labors of others?78 
Like the print media, a lawyer sells information, though she sells 
other services as well, including performance skills (in litigation and 
negotiation). But many legal services consist solely of an explanation of 
what the law is, often followed by the application of legal rules to the 
client’s particular circumstances, which may include creation of a 
document. Documents are information tailored to a particular need and 
may demand little or no legal judgment or customizing, depending on the 
complexity of the client’s objective. The same delivery system—the 
Internet—that is disrupting the news media has changed and will 
continue to change the way legal services are marketed. Indeed, when we 
look at the disruptive externalities in combination, which I presently do, 
it can seem near to delusional to think that the geocentric model for 
regulating lawyers and legal services, or justifications for that model that 
rely on differences in the laws across U.S. jurisdictions, can continue as is. 
A. Lawyers Without Borders 
1. Virtual Presence, Part One 
A simple story that reveals the fading of place as a basis for lawyer 
regulation concerns a lawyer named Cedar P. Carlton.79 This story may 
turn out to be one of those otherwise unremarkable, indeed entirely 
forgettable, decisions that signifies the need to revamp the regulatory 
model precisely because of its ordinariness. 
Ms. Carlton worked for a Washington, D.C. law firm. She was a 
member of the D.C. bar and the bar of the District Court for the District 
 
 77. See, e.g., Russell Baker, Goodbye to Newspapers?, N.Y. Rev. Books, Aug. 16, 2007; Michael 
Massing, The End of News?, N.Y. Rev. Books, Dec. 1, 2005; David Carr, The Fall and Rise of Media, 
N.Y. Times (Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/30/business/media/30carr.html. 
 78. That vehicle, the aggregator, is now ubiquitous. Prominent examples include The Huffington 
Post and Slate. 
 79. In re Carlton, 708 F. Supp. 2d 524 (D. Md. 2010). 
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of Maryland.80 In 2008 she applied to renew her district court 
membership.81 Her application revealed that she lived in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, and did most of her work “from home or from an office 
space in Boston.”82 She was not a member of the Massachusetts bar.83 
The district court’s local rule required that lawyers admitted to its bar 
“must be, and continuously remain, a member in good standing of the 
highest court of any state (or the District of Columbia) in which the 
attorney maintains his or her principal law office, or the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland.”84 The district court asked Ms. Carlton to advise “how her 
office in Washington, D.C. can be her principal office if she is spending 
the majority of her time in Massachusetts either at home or in an 
office”85—a fair question. 
Ms. Carlton’s response, in essence, was that her office was not 
where she lived or worked but where she virtually practiced.86 Her mail 
was sent to Washington, D.C. and forwarded to Cambridge.87 Her clients 
called her on a D.C. phone number.88 Hard-copy communications, 
including pleadings, were mailed from D.C. Electronic communications 
could be sent from anywhere including Cambridge.89 She did not hold 
herself out as a lawyer in Massachusetts and had no clients there.90 So far 
as the world was concerned, she was professionally invisible in 
Massachusetts.91 
The court recognized the new world. It approved her application, 
writing: 
  In recent years, the concept of a “principal law office” has evolved 
somewhat as a result of significant advances in technology which 
provide an attorney with the flexibility to carry out a variety of 
activities at different locations and under varying circumstances. The 
term does not necessarily mean continuous physical presence but, at a 
minimum, it requires some physical presence sufficient to assure 
accountability of the attorney to clients and the court. Under the 
circumstances described by Ms. Carlton, there can be no question that 
for purposes of malpractice insurance coverage, tax obligations and 
client security trust fund obligations, her office is the office of her 
employer. In addition, the address utilized in pleadings, correspondence 
 
 80. Id. at 525. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. (quoting Dist. Md. R. 701.1(a)). 
 85. Id. (quoting Judge Peter J. Messitte, Chair of the Disciplinary and Admissions Committee of 
the Washington, D.C. Bar).  
 86. Id. at 525–26. 
 87. Id. at 526. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 525. 
 91. Id. 
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with clients, letterhead and other matters is also the address of her 
employer, which maintains a substantial physical presence in 
Washington, D.C. When meetings with clients are required, Ms. Carlton 
does meet with them in Washington, D.C. Her client files, accounting 
records and other business records, library and communication facilities 
such as telephone and fax service are all located in Washington, D.C. 
although, by virtue of advances in technology, she is able to access 
them remotely from Cambridge, Massachusetts.92 
The court tried to distinguish Ms. Carlton’s situation from that of a 
lawyer whose presence in a jurisdiction was “a mere ‘mail drop.’”93 It 
would not allow so slim a nexus because a mail drop would not “assure 
accountability of the lawyer to the court and to clients . . . . Where the 
principal law office is not located where the attorney is a member of the 
bar, essential public oversight of the attorney’s practice is diminished.”94 
I appreciate that the court did not want to go out too far on a limb, 
but the line between a mail drop and Ms. Carlton’s situation is not self-
evident. Indeed, the term “mail drop” has no precise meaning. Nor is it 
clear why a mail drop (however defined) impedes oversight. Probably 
thousands of lawyers move yearly from one state to another, leaving not 
even a mail drop behind, while maintaining bar membership in both the 
old and new places. Or a lawyer who once would have opted for a mail 
drop can now approximate Ms. Carlton’s situation in Washington, D.C., 
yet rarely appear there. As with Ms. Carlton, the world will think that 
professionally she is in a place that she is not. 
In any event, this ruling reveals a thoroughly modern view and we 
might expect more of the same. Ms. Carlton could practice D.C. or 
Maryland law from anyplace so long as she maintained a modest physical 
connection to Washington. If she could practice from anyplace 
(including, as the court realized, by “telecommut[ing]”95), how can place 
remain as a principal basis for regulation? 
2. Virtual Presence, Part Two 
Perhaps you wonder about Massachusetts’s interest in all this. The 
federal court in Maryland may be content, but Ms. Carlton is practicing 
law while physically in Massachusetts. Similarly, Richard Granat lives 
full time in Florida, where he is not admitted. As the ABA Journal 
described his work in its “Legal Rebels” series: 
 
 92. Id. at 526–27. 
 93. Id. at 527. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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Granat works out of his house in Palm Beach Gardens, Fla. The floor 
in his home office serves as a filing system, and he uses three 
computers simultaneously—a Macintosh desktop to watch Twitter 
feeds and stock quotes, a PC for actual work and a MacBook Air to 
walk around with when the desk chair bothers his back. 
Fifteen employees, who also work remotely, help Granat run his 
different businesses. 
. . . . 
One [of Granat’s websites], MDFamilyLawyer.com, offers family law 
forms bundled at a fixed price with legal advice to residents in 
Maryland and Washington, D.C., where Granat is licensed. Users 
answer a set of questions—how many children they have, their 
separation date, whether they own property—generating a form for 
court filings. Contested cases are referred elsewhere. 
Granat spends about 30 minutes daily with that site, and it earns him 
about $100,000 a year. The site focuses on simple matters; he estimates 
that only about 10 percent of the users require forms with customized 
language. 
Another site, DirectLaw, licenses Granat’s technology to small firms 
and solo practitioners. Once the site gets 50 users, he plans to create a 
community for them—to exchange ideas and “let them complain about 
me.”96 
In response to the possibility that the Florida Bar would deem him 
to be practicing in the state, Granat replied: 
I only serve Maryland residents which I check when they register for 
my web site. Moreover, I have an official Maryland law firm address in 
Owings Mills, Maryland and a Maryland phone number which calls 
forward to my Florida number. Our web servers are actually located in 
Maryland. I attend bar events in Maryland and participate in CLE 
events in Maryland. 
I have no “business contacts” in Florida related to the delivery of legal 
services, and have no relationship as a lawyer to Florida’s citizens. 
Obviously I never serve Florida residents, as my web site makes clear. 
I am subject to Maryland disciplinary rules of course, which don’t on 
[their] face state that I have to live in Maryland, or in fact even 
maintain an office in Maryland which I do. I maintain a malpractice 
policy through a Maryland insurer. 
So who should care where I live, as long as Maryland’s citizens are 
protected from the potential or actual malpractice. . . . 
In the age of the Internet, the idea that a state bar would exercise 
jurisdiction of a lawyer who resides in its state, but practices elsewhere 
and doesn’t offer its services to the state residents, is in my opinion an 
over reaching which won’t stand a judicial test. This is a case that I 
would be happy to defend.97 
 
 96. Stephanie Francis Ward, Richard Granat: Internet Obsessive, ABA J. Legal Rebels (Aug. 24, 
2009, 3:19 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/internet_obsessive. 
 97. Richard Granat, Comment to Living in FL, Practice in MD and DC, $100M p/a for 30 
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As would I. But under the nineteenth-century regulatory model, it is 
not the law you practice, it is where you practice law.98 Granat is in 
Florida physically but his practice is in Maryland virtually. Should that 
free him from the constraints of Florida regulation? Of course. But once 
we say as much, we have to rethink regulation based on physical place.99 
3. Virtual Law Offices 
A laptop with an Internet connection allows us to “talk” to 
colleagues, clients, and adversaries as though we were in the office next 
door or a building across town. And it accommodates international calls 
for next to nothing using Skype or other voice-over-Internet services.100 
Lawyers have remarked to me that even when in their office, they 
 
Minutes Per Day, Legal Ethics Forum (Aug. 28, 2009, 9:26 AM), http://www.legalethicsforum.com/ 
blog/2009/08/living-in-fl-practice-in-md-and-dc-100m-pa-for-30-minutes-per-day.html#comments. 
 98. Not in these precise words, but in effect, that was the basis for denying a lawyer a $4 million 
fee in Servidone Construction Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 911 F. Supp. 560, 571, 576 
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying a fee in a matter to a lawyer who practiced from an office in New York, 
where he was not admitted, notwithstanding that the matter was before federal courts outside New 
York, where he was admitted). 
 99. But see Gould v. Fla. Bar, 259 F. App’x 208, 210 (11th Cir. 2007). A New York lawyer living in 
Florida wanted to counsel persons in Florida, who might be residents of Florida, New York, or 
elsewhere, but on New York law only. The court upheld the bar’s argument that the work would be 
unlawful: 
  We first address Gould’s challenge to the regulation of his proposed advertisement for 
the provision of legal services relating to New York legal matters from his Florida office. 
Gould complains that he has a credible fear of prosecution for publishing the following 
advertisement: 
NEW YORK LEGAL MATTERS ONLY 
M. RONALD GOULD LICENSED NEW YORK 
ATTORNEY 1201 BRICKELL AVENUE, STE. 630 
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33131 
FREE PHONE CONSULTATION 305 865 2962 
The Florida Bar responds that the proposed advertisement concerns unlawful activity. 
  We agree with the Florida Bar. Under Florida law, it is unlawful for “[a]ny person not 
licensed or otherwise authorized to practice law in [Florida]” to practice law within the 
State of Florida. Fla. Stat. § 454.23 (2004). Gould, who is not admitted to the Florida Bar, 
does not have the authority to practice New York law in Florida. . . . Because the proposed 
advertisement concerns unlawful activity, the Florida Bar is entitled to regulate the 
advertisement. 
Id. What is the difference between what Gould wished to do and what Granat does? Only the 
presumed physical location of the client and the fact that Granat’s work is, in a sense, invisible in 
Florida, whereas Gould wished to advertise his services there. I say “presumed physical location” 
because so far as Granat can know, a person using his Maryland or D.C. law website may be doing so 
while spending the winter in Florida. But Granat is meeting his client in cyberspace, not Florida space. 
When we begin to make these distinctions, it should be apparent that the traditional model of 
regulation is flirting with a journey to Wonderland. 
 100. Voice-over-Internet services like Skype allow a user to call from one computer to another, or 
from a computer to a landline phone or cell phone. See Support, Skype, http://support.skype.com/en-us 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
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communicate with colleagues down the hall or a floor above via email, 
not in person. The same is true in my law school. As video conferencing 
becomes seamless and crisper, any lingering sense that meetings should 
occur in physical space will be seen as sentimental. All but long and 
important meetings will rapidly succumb to convenience and cost. I 
predict that jury trials will remain live and in person, but many trials to 
judges and arguments will be held in virtual courtrooms. Why not?101 
Here, we may return to the two lawyers whose practices started the 
investigation of the place of anyplace: Cedar Carlton and Richard 
Granat.102 Each had a physical office bigger than a mail drop, which the 
Maryland federal district court said it would not tolerate, though it did 
not define the term. But what need is there for an office at all, even a 
mail drop, except to get mail? Why can’t a practice take place in virtual 
reality only? Of course, some practices will not lend themselves, at least 
not easily, to an entirely virtual existence. Examples are large corporate 
deals that require conference rooms and day-long meetings, and complex 
civil litigation with depositions and document discovery by the carload. 
But many practices should be able to fit in a virtual world. Meetings if 
necessary can occur in physical space—a coffee shop, a hotel lobby or 
conference room, or even a park, but often meetings will not be 
necessary or desirable. A lawyer can do her work at home or at a bar 
association library table. The only addresses on her card will be for her 
website and email and the only number will be for her cell phone. 
As it happens, state bar ethics committees in two neighboring states 
confronted the question of a virtual law office (“VLO”) in 2010 and 
disagreed. Two New Jersey court committees disapproved of a virtual 
office on the grounds that a lawyer needs a physical office in the state to 
 
 101. Discussion of “virtual courtrooms” has been underway for more than a decade. Michigan has 
created “cyber courts” as courts of record. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.8001 (2011) (making these 
courts available with consent in commercial cases and subject to other conditions); see Fredric I. 
Lederer, The Road to the Virtual Courtroom? A Consideration of Today’s—and Tomorrow’s—High-
Technology Courtrooms, 50 S.C. L. Rev. 799 (1999). We cannot, of course, know what rules will 
govern the virtual courtroom of the future, nor the kinds of matters for which they may be available. 
We can be confident, however, that technology increasingly will make them possible. The prospect 
that lawyers will on occasion choose a virtual courtroom for the argument of a motion or an appeal is 
unremarkable. Lawyers today submit motions and appeals without any argument, as anyone who has 
ever sat through a calendar call knows firsthand. Factors that will influence a lawyer’s decision will 
include the perceived benefit from physical presence, if any; the quality of the technology; distance to 
the courthouse; cost in legal fees for the time spent in travel; and client preference. Cost to the state 
and inconvenience of travel may cause multimember appellate courts to mandate virtual arguments in 
categories of matters, say an interlocutory appeal on a nondispositive procedural motion in a state 
intermediate appellate court where the judges’ chambers are hundreds of miles apart. I exclude jury 
trials as a likely candidate for the virtual courtroom, both civil and criminal, because jurors expect to 
be in a physical place (and customarily deliberate in one) and to have the lawyers and witnesses there 
as well, an expectation I doubt we will want to deny, especially in criminal cases where the verdict will 
affect freedom. 
 102. See supra Parts III.A.1, III.A.2. 
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satisfy a court rule requiring a “bona fide office.”103 Although no lawyer 
need be continually at the site, a “responsible person . . . to answer 
questions posed by the court, clients or adversaries” must be present.104 
Except for brief periods when the lawyer and a “responsible person” are 
absent, a receptionist who is not an employee of the lawyer will not 
suffice, not even if the receptionist can easily redirect calls to the lawyer’s 
cell phone.105 How do we explain this insistence on physical location? 
What difference does it make whether the “responsible person” is at a 
desk in an office in a building on a street or is instead available from 
anywhere by phone, with in-person meetings arranged as required? The 
value we want to protect is availability, not availability in a defined 
physical place. 
By contrast, a Pennsylvania State Bar ethics opinion fully supported 
the use of a VLO.106 A lawyer with a VLO need not have a physical 
address anywhere and may use a post office box for mail, the opinion 
said.107 Like lawyers in real space, she must be able to confirm the 
identity of clients and others.108 A virtual law firm may consist of more 
than one attorney, each working from an undisclosed address, even their 
homes.109 And perhaps most interesting, the lawyers need not even be 
working in Pennsylvania.110 Whether a Pennsylvania lawyer working in 
another state, although serving only Pennsylvania clients virtually, runs 
afoul of the other state’s unauthorized practice rules is not an issue the 
committee addressed. Could Massachusetts or Florida stop Cedar Carlton 
or Richard Granat? It is doubtful, but why would they even wish to try? 
4. Online Legal Research 
At one time, lawyers needed books, the number and kind depending 
on the nature of their practice. Books required space and could be 
transported easily only in small numbers. The books anchored the 
lawyers to a physical place. Technology has erased physical place as the 
repository of legal information. It has eliminated the corporality of the 
sources of law and made quaint the place that once housed them—the 
law library. Unlike the effect of technology on the place of lawyers, here 
its effect is on the place of the information lawyers need to work. Who 
today depends on the law library for research? Our law libraries are now 
digital, so the law of nearly anywhere is available nearly anywhere. It is 
 
 103. N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Comm. on Attorney Adver., Joint Op. 718/41 (2010). 
 104. Id. (quoting N.J. Disciplinary Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1:21-1(a)).  
 105. Id. 
 106. Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2010-200 (2010). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
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only a matter of time before the law library, as we have known it for 
centuries, disappears. The few that remain will be more in the nature of 
museums, containing books, manuscripts, and archives that for economic, 
historical, or legal reasons have not been digitized. 
The change in the source of legal information means lawyers now 
take their law libraries with them. Thousands of pages of information can 
be transported in a laptop (or accessed on a computer anywhere) 
equipped with a fast Internet connection and a Westlaw or Lexis 
password. The hard copy that anchored us to place is history, and with it 
so is one of the few obstacles to the practice of law from anywhere. 
Though the effect may be less dramatic than for other developments, 
technology further undermines reliance on physical place by allowing us 
to access on that same laptop, via a flash drive, a virtual private network, 
or a “cloud,” any documents we may need to do our work, including 
drafts of contracts and briefs. We can access our office files from ten 
thousand miles away. There is no practical limit on volume. 
B. Law Without Lawyers 
1. Computer Programs 
In 1965, Norman Dacey wrote a book called How to Avoid 
Probate.111 New York lawyers tried to stop its sale.112 They claimed that 
through the book Dacey, who was not a lawyer, was practicing law.113 The 
book might have been seen as a threat to the bar’s income because it 
coached readers on how to organize their assets so that on death their 
property passed to their heirs without going through probate court, which 
would require paying a lawyer.114 After some uncertainty, the state high 
court rejected the effort to ban Dacey’s book.115 There was the little 
matter of the First Amendment.116 Similar efforts to prevent the sale of 
forms that consumers could use to represent themselves, often in divorce, 
were also unsuccessful unless the seller made the mistake of helping the 
buyer fill out the form, no matter how elemental the help, at which point 
the activity became law practice and unlawful in some states.117 It was not 
the bar’s finest hour. 
 
 111. Norman F. Dacey, How to Avoid Probate! (1st ed. 1965). 
 112. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Dacey, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, 987–88 (App. Div. 1967). 
 113. Id. at 988–89. 
 114. Dacey, supra note 111, at 10–12. 
 115. The lower appellate court, over dissent, ruled against Dacey, but the state’s high court 
reversed. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 987–88, rev’d 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967). 
 116. The dissent in the lower court cited the First Amendment, and the Court of Appeals’ opinion 
reversing the decision was based on this dissent. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Dacey, 234 N.E.2d 459, 
459 (N.Y. 1967). 
 117. Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1978); Or. State Bar v. Gilchrist, 538 P.2d 
913, 916 (Or. 1975). 
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All that became an historical curiosity with the arrival of the 
computer. A computer, after all, with seemingly limitless memory and 
capacity for interaction with a live user (formerly called “a client”), can 
be programmed to do what lawyers do, at least for routine tasks—ask 
questions, follow-up questions, and so on, eventually delivering a 
document if desired. Dacey sold one book, but a program in a “cloud” 
can contain a vast library and accommodate many factual variations and 
jurisdictional differences. The monetary stakes are potentially quite high, 
which may explain the effort of some Texas lawyers to seek to stop the 
sale of a program called Quicken Family Lawyer.118 The district court 
issued a preliminary injunction,119 but the case became moot during the 
pendency of the appeal, when the Texas legislature amended the state’s 
unauthorized practice law to allow Quicken’s business.120 
A computer can do what Norman Dacey could not even dream of 
doing: answer questions and produce legal documents tailored to a user’s 
particular needs under the law of any jurisdiction. Like a tax preparation 
program, a law program can respond to a consumer’s selections with 
simple questions, the answers to which determine the next question. It 
can do this for estate plans, divorce documents, separation agreements, 
contracts for the sale of a home, and simple bankruptcies. It can generate 
forms to incorporate a small business, to apply for not-for-profit status, 
to create a partnership, to register a trademark or copyright, and to 
change a name. It can help a user write a persuasive demand letter in a 
dispute with a business, with citations to applicable law. In short, 
computer programs can offer products that are part of many lawyers’ 
inventory of routine services, and will be more effective than traditional 
services to the extent that the programs encompass a manageable 
universe of options—especially if they are form driven, requiring a “fill in 
the blanks” orientation, rather than judgment. 
Self-help of this nature is not advisable for all clients. It may be 
especially unwise if the matter is complex. But that is not the question. It 
is available to those who elect it.121 Predictions that a program will miss 
subtleties, while often so, will not prevent their availability, especially for 
the routine services that contain few or no subtleties. People who feel 
comfortable taking a chance will do so. The state can (and should) 
require cautions and warnings, as Texas does,122 but it cannot stop the 
 
 118. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. CIV.A. 3:97CV-2859H, 1999 
WL 47235 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 2, 1999), vacated, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff was composed 
of six lawyers and three laypersons. Id. at *1. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956, 956 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 121. Apart from proprietary software, a person seeking a simple form, like a power of attorney or 
a medical proxy, could use a Google search to find a specific jurisdiction’s valid version of the form. 
The attraction of interactive software is enhanced if the user needs guidance in filling in the blanks. 
 122. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 179 F.3d at 956. 
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business. The simple fact is that some legal services can be mass-
produced, standardized, and commodified. Lawyers have long known 
this. As a young lawyer, I was once asked to represent the buyer of a 
cooperative apartment. I fretted over the level of sophistication required 
until an older lawyer told me that the necessary “fill in the blanks” forms 
were available for a few dollars at the stationery store. Other tasks were 
required, too, but the standard forms greatly simplified the work. 
Now, unlike Dacey, presumably the worker bees who write the 
programs are lawyers (though not lawyers in every user’s jurisdiction). So 
it is not strictly true to say that this situation reflects the sale of law 
without lawyers, but the lawyers are so far in the background that a 
comparison to the traditional model of the lawyer-client relationship is 
unhelpful. So long as the lawyers who write or contribute to the writing 
of the law-giving programs do not personally advise the people using 
them (we won’t call them clients), directly or through subordinates, the 
program cannot be banned any more than the bar could ban Dacey’s 
book. I emphasize that the state does have a legitimate interest in 
protecting the consumer against sloppy or ignorant work, and offer 
suggestions of how it might do that,123 but that interest will not allow a 
categorical ban.124 
2. Nonlegal Services 
California’s Birbrower decision addressed the conduct of New York 
lawyers who came to the state in anticipation of an arbitration. The 
majority in a 6–1 opinion found that the New York lawyers sacrificed 
their fees for work done physically or (from New York) virtually in 
California because their “extensive” presence “in” the state violated its 
unauthorized practice law.125 The dissenting judge agreed with the 
majority’s conclusion that the lawyers’ presence in California was 
“extensive.”126 However, she did not view the lawyer’s work—preparing 
for an arbitration—as the practice of law.127 For this conclusion, she had 
authority from a federal district court in New York.128 Since Birbrower, at 
least two other courts, one state and one federal, have likewise 
 
 123. See infra text accompanying notes 213–216. 
 124. In a variation on this theme, computer programs are replacing human labor in law firms. 
While there is still a law firm in the picture, the software does the work that lawyers once did, but 
faster and cheaper. John Markoff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers, Replaced by Cheaper Software, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 4, 2011, at A1 (describing software that reviews documents using a “sociological approach 
[that] adds an inferential layer of analysis, mimicking the deductive powers of a human Sherlock 
Holmes”). 
 125. Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1998). 
 126. Id. at 18. 
 127. Id. at 16 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
 128. Id. at 18 (citing Williamson v. John D. Quinn Const. Corp., 537 F. Supp. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982)). 
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concluded that representation of a party in a pending or impending 
arbitration is not the practice of law, even when (as was true in these 
three cases) the work is done by a lawyer.129 
The view that a lawyer advocating in arbitration is not practicing law 
draws strength from the conceded fact that an arbitrator need not be a 
lawyer, not even if the agreement to arbitrate specifies that the law of a 
particular jurisdiction will govern the dispute.130 If the “judge” need not 
be a lawyer, why should the advocates have to be lawyers? And if the 
advocates do not have to be lawyers, shouldn’t it follow that even if they 
are lawyers, their work complies with unauthorized practice rules? It 
would be passing strange if a nonlawyer may advocate in an arbitration 
but a lawyer admitted in another state may not. So if the dissenting 
Birbrower judge and the three courts that agree with her are correct, a 
forum in which law is applied and legal rights are determined can operate 
without lawyers or with lawyers who are not subject to the jurisdiction’s 
rules on unauthorized practice. 
3. Legal Process Outsourcing 
Legal process outsourcing (“LPO”) is both a new and an old 
phenomenon.131 It is old because, at bottom, it is simply the delegation of 
some part of a law firm’s legal or support work to another person or 
entity outside the firm. A large photocopying job sent to Kinko’s might 
be called LPO. So could an independent contractor hired to investigate 
an incident or to maintain and ensure security for a law firm’s voicemail, 
email, and computer systems.132 We do not seem to use the LPO term 
when a firm affiliates with another law firm, either as local counsel or 
because of its particular expertise. Perhaps this is because the word 
“process” does not fit. So one defining quality of LPO might be whether 
the outside organization is a law firm in its own right or only an 
 
 129. Prudential Equity Grp., LLC v. Ajamie, 538 F. Supp. 2d 605, 607–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Colmar, 
Ltd. v. Fremantlemedia N. Am., Inc., 801 N.E.2d 1017, 1022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); see In re Town of 
Little Compton, No. 2011-101-M.P., 2012 WL 424385 (R.I. Feb. 9, 2012) (holding that a nonlawyer had 
not engaged in unauthorized law practice by representing a union at a labor arbitration). 
 130. Donna M. Bates, A Consumer’s Dream or Pandora’s Box: Is Arbitration a Viable Option for 
Cross-Border Consumer Disputes?, 27 Fordham Int’l L.J. 823, 857 n.132 (2004). 
 131. The subject has attracted wide attention. E.g., Heather Timmons, Due Diligence from Afar, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 2010, at B1; Passage to India: The Growth of Legal Outsourcing, Economist, June 
28, 2010, at 69. The number of organizations offering outsourcing services is large in the United States 
and abroad, numbering 140 at the end of 2009. Timmons, supra. Revenue is predicted “to grow to $440 
million” in 2010, “up 38 percent from 2008, and should surpass $1 billion by 2014,” according to 
Valuenotes, an Indian consultancy. Id. While the bar attempts to identify the precautions required of a 
lawyer who employs an LPO on behalf of clients, see, for example, ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 451 (2008), there seems to be no plausible claim that outsourcing is 
categorically forbidden. 
 132. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 398 (1995) (allowing a 
firm to give outside service providers access to the firm’s database). 
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organization whose work supports the work that a law firm is doing for 
the ultimate client. 
But what if the LPO entity is not a law firm but the work requires or 
benefits from some discretion and legal training? What if it is work that 
law firms (or corporate law offices) have traditionally performed for a 
client in-house, perhaps using paralegals or new associates? Before it 
became feasible and economical to send LPO work abroad, the closest 
that U.S. firms came (and still come) to domestic outsourcing of law-
related work was the use of contract lawyers, who may be supplied by a 
temporary employment agency.133 These were lawyers whom the firm 
might not hire as full-time employees or who did not want a full-time job 
(for example, a person who is a new parent, easing into retirement, or 
writing a screenplay). Contracting with them on a project basis avoided 
expanding permanent staff and could make the project cheaper, which 
appealed to the client. The firm, meanwhile, could still mark up the cost 
and earn a profit on their time just as it profited from associate time.134 
The challenging question that once surrounded contract or temporary 
lawyers concerned conflicts: Do the same imputation rules that apply to 
traditional firm lawyers also apply to temporary lawyers, who move from 
firm to firm, possibly monthly? If so, the temporary lawyer industry 
could be seriously curtailed, though not shut down. As it happens, after 
some uncertainty, the answer has been no, as hereafter explained.135 
Should foreign outsourcing be any different from domestic 
outsourcing? True, the work travels across an international border, 
whereas the contract lawyer may work on the firm’s premises or in a 
domestic venue leased just for them. Should that matter? Surely the fact 
that money that once went into the pockets of U.S. lawyers and work 
that earned markup profits for partners of U.S. firms are diverted abroad 
does not raise ethical issues.136 The point for now is that the profession 
has not fussed as much over the dangers of and proper constraints on 
 
 133. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 356 (1988). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See infra text accompanying notes 143–146. 
 136. The ABA and the New York City Bar Association agree that if the outsource charge is passed 
to the client as a disbursement, there can be no markup, but the firm can bill for its actual costs and 
reasonable overhead, if any. There are not likely to be overhead costs if the work is done abroad. 
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 451 (2008); N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Comm. on 
Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 3 (2006). The ABA opinion, however, seems to envision that the 
firm may earn a profit on the outsourced work if the charge is not presented as a disbursement. This is 
not likely to be consequential. Clients that require and agree to outsourcing are probably looking to 
save money and will insist that the charges be presented without addition, except for the oversight 
work of the firm. What is quite clear is that outsourcing redirects a substantial income stream from 
traditional law firms to service providers elsewhere. See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, Leah Cooper: 
Passage to India, ABA J. Legal Rebels (Oct. 13, 2009, 9:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
legalrebels/article/leah_cooper (reporting that between May and October 2009, outsourcing had saved 
the Rio Tinto Group “more than $4 million in legal fees”). 
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domestic outsourcing as it has over foreign outsourcing, as evidenced by 
articles and bar opinions.137 
Today, it appears likely, although we are still in the formative 
period, that foreign outsourcing will survive ethical hurdles that may yet 
be put before it. Indeed, no serious claim has been leveled that 
outsourcing, whether domestic or foreign, is inherently unethical. The 
focus has been on how it is done.138 Insofar as outsourcing remains a 
matter of professional attention, it will be in part because the outsourced 
tasks are becoming more sophisticated and therefore more threatening 
to the domestic legal market and because of growth in the industry. 
Instead of reading documents on a screen to decide if they fall within one 
of two or three defined categories and must be produced in discovery—
an early outsourced service—we may be moving toward what might be 
called knowledge outsourcing. The LPO entity abroad is doing work 
closer to the core lawyering tasks of domestic lawyers, thereby greatly 
expanding the potential for lost work and income, at least for some legal 
specialties and more prominently for younger lawyers. The trend can 
only increase. Labor costs can be much lower abroad where there are 
legally trained (or trainable) people capable of doing increasingly 
sophisticated work.139 Many may have studied in United States or other 
common-law schools and some may be members of a U.S. bar.140 
In outsourcing, there remains a U.S. lawyer between the client and 
the workers abroad—presumably reviewing and accepting responsibility 
for the work. But outsourcing also entails law without lawyers. What we 
recognize as a legal service—a description that will become increasingly 
accurate as the outsourced work becomes more specialized—will be 
 
 137. See supra note 136; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics 20/20, Sample Bibliography, ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/ethics_2020/outsourcing_bibliography.
authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 138. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 451 (2008). Opinions like this 
one address protection of client confidences, the duty of competence and diligence in selecting the 
outsource provider, conflicts of interest, aiding unauthorized law practice, and how the cost may be 
passed on to the client. 
 139. The size and growth of the industry is illustrated in the submissions to the ABA Commission 
on Ethics 20/20. See ABA Comm. on Ethics 20/20, Legal Process Outsourcing Comments & 
Summaries, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/ethics_2020/ 
outsourcing_comments.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). Pangea3, one of the largest 
companies in the industry and owned by Thomson Reuters, offers legal research, contract drafting and 
revision, and e-discovery review, among other services. Solutions, Pangea3, http://www.pangea3.com/ 
legal-outsourcing-services.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 140. In 2010, 4596 foreign educated lawyers took the New York bar examination. A total of 5761 
such lawyers took an American bar examination. Persons Taking and Passing the 2010 Bar 
Examination by Source of Legal Education, Bar Examiner, Mar. 2011, at 10, 11 [hereinafter 2010 
Statistics]. Because of the bar admission requirements in New York and elsewhere, the great majority 
of these applicants have an American J.D. or LL.M., a degree from a common-law school, or both. For 
conditions for foreign-educated lawyers to take the New York and California bar examinations, see 
infra text accompanying notes 235–253. 
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performed by workers who are not admitted to a U.S. bar or any bar; or, 
if some are lawyers somewhere, the organization they work for may not 
be a law firm. The U.S. lawyer intermediary cannot review all of their 
work, otherwise the outsourcing would save no money and might as well 
be done by a lawyer at home. 
Foreign LPO is not merely an interesting development made 
possible by the ease of sending documents abroad instantly (and perhaps 
having the work done during America’s night). It is a big business.141 But 
it eliminates local jobs. Money that clients of U.S. firms save is money 
U.S. lawyers do not earn. Lawyers have now joined other providers of 
goods and services in seeing their work done more cheaply abroad. Like 
computers, televisions, and cars, law is a product produced elsewhere and 
exported to the United States (if only as “parts” of the final product). If 
the ability is there and the price differential remains large, the amount and 
sophistication of the redirected work will continue to grow. 
Recently, we have seen examples of domestic outsourcing of legal 
work to an entity that is not a law firm but that hires lawyers to handle 
the work.142 This reversal of work back to the United States may have 
been encouraged by creation of excess legal talent in a contracting 
market for firm lawyers. A domestic LPO may have the further 
advantage of a staff of admitted American lawyers and whatever comfort 
to clients that keeping the work in-country affords. It is too soon to say 
whether the reverse trend will continue if law firm hiring returns to 
earlier levels or if the cost differences are large. 
C. Law Without Law Firms 
1. Nonconventional Firms 
Just as a labyrinth of rules governs who can be a lawyer “in” a place, 
another set of rules defines the practice settings in which lawyers may 
work. Three settings dominate: private law offices, counsel offices of 
private for-profit and nonprofit organizations, and government. (Public 
interest law firms will fall within the second category.) But a fourth 
player may be on the horizon, fostered by other developments discussed 
here, especially technology. 
 
 141. See supra note 131. 
 142. See Heather Timmons, Where Lawyers Find Work, N.Y. Times, June 3, 2011, at B1. Pillsbury 
Winthrop has chosen to keep its outsourcing not only in the U.S. but also in-house. Law Firm Service 
Center in Nashville Could Employ 150, Tennessean (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.nashvillechamber.com/ 
Homepage/NewsEvents/News/11-10-18/Law_firm_service_center_in_Nashville_could_employ_150.aspx. 
The firm reported that the internal service center “will provide back-office services such as 
information technology, finance, client intake, word processing and other non-legal professional 
services for [the firm’s] 14 offices worldwide.” Id.  
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As introduced in the outsourcing discussion above,143 in the 1980s, 
bar ethics committees were asked to address the growing phenomenon of 
temporary lawyers, now sometimes called contract lawyers. These were 
individuals admitted to the bar and hired to work on discrete matters for 
a limited period of time. A firm may have a large antitrust case and need 
many lawyers to sift through documents, but when the case or the 
discovery has ended, the lawyers will no longer be needed. The firm does 
not want to increase permanent staff. Of course, such an arrangement 
presents no problem whether the lawyers are hired temporarily or 
retained as independent contractors. However, because these lawyers 
often work through employment agencies that receive payment, one 
question was whether the agency’s fee would violate the rule against 
splitting a legal fee with a nonlawyer. A law firm might sometimes pay 
the agency the full amount due the lawyer for each week of work, and 
the agency would then subtract its fee and send the lawyer the balance. 
Bar groups concluded that the arrangement did not violate the rule 
against splitting fees with nonlawyers.144 
The more challenging question concerned conflicts of interest. If a 
temporary lawyer has worked at a law firm representing party A in the 
matter of A v. B, could she then work for the law firm that represented 
party B, even if she is hired to work on a completely unrelated matter 
involving different parties? At the time (and still), a significant number 
of U.S. jurisdictions did not recognize screening of lateral lawyers to 
avoid imputation of conflicts or did (and do) so only in limited 
circumstances.145 So if our lawyer had been a permanent employee of the 
firm representing party A and then moved to the firm representing party 
B, the rules in these jurisdictions would impute the lawyer’s conflict to 
the second firm’s lawyers, who could not then continue to represent 
party B without informed client consent. That in turn meant that the 
lawyer might not get an offer from the second firm as long as the A v. B 
matter was pending. While such a disability might be inconvenient for 
permanent employees, if applied to temporary lawyers, whose 
professional lives are characterized by frequent migration between firms, 
it would seriously limit their capacity to work and the business of the 
agencies that supplied them. Eventually, bar ethics committees concluded 
that the lateral temporary lawyer could be screened even if the lateral 
permanent employee could not be screened.146 
 
 143. See supra text accompanying notes 133–135. 
 144. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 356, at 47 (1988); N.Y.C. 
Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2 (1989). 
 145. As of 2011, the rules of twenty-four U.S. jurisdictions recognized screening of lateral lawyers 
moving from private practice to avoid conflict imputation at least in some circumstances. ABA, 
Lateral Lawyer Screening Status (Jan. 11, 2011). 
 146. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 356, at 41 (1988). 
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It could have ended there. But then an associate at a large New 
York firm realized that the doctrinal authority for temporary lawyers and 
the agencies that furnish them could also support assembly of teams of 
specialists, not merely individual lawyers to perform low discretionary 
work.147 That associate created a company called Axiom, where such 
teams are available to work on particular assignments requiring greater 
skill and knowledge than generally required of contract lawyers. The 
teams can disband when their assignments end. Team members might 
then recombine, possibly with other lawyers, for a new assignment and so 
on. Each project can attract its own team depending on availability and 
expertise. Formally, each of the assembled lawyers is an Axiom employee 
working for a client on a temporary or contract basis. Members of the 
team do not have a formal relationship with each other. They do not 
comprise a law firm. But in reality, they will be chosen for their 
complementary skills. The work they do is more sophisticated than was 
true in the early days of temporary lawyer agencies and still true for 
many contract lawyers today. 
The rules governing lawyers say that only lawyers may have an 
equity interest or management authority in for-profit firms.148 The 
prohibition is justified on a questionable but durable assumption. If 
powerful nonlawyers in law firms are positioned to influence the 
compensation and status of firm lawyers, they may cause the lawyers to 
violate ethical obligations if they believe that doing so will enhance the 
finances of the firm and therefore their own. Unlike lawyers, the 
nonlawyers are not governed by legal ethics rules, do not have to worry 
about professional discipline, and might be quite willing to violate duties 
to clients, courts, or others in order to enrich themselves, or so it has 
been explained. This danger is seen as so great that it has been deemed 
necessary to categorically ban nonlawyers from any financial interest in 
law firms no matter what steps might be taken to ensure good conduct.149 
Axiom owes its existence to these early bar association opinions on 
temporary lawyers.150 It is not a law firm and would not dare call itself a 
law firm, although it is often described as such in press stories, some of 
 
 147. The following information about Axiom and its origins is drawn from my conversations on 
August 17, 2011, and October 28, 2011, with Mark Harris, one of its founders. For a description of 
Axiom’s work and how it describes itself, see the company’s website. Axiom Law, www.axiomlaw.com 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 148. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4 (2010). 
 149. Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 10 cmt. b (2000). How this exclusion 
squares with the fact that nonlawyers are trusted to behave in other important areas of life, including 
on corporate boards and heads of powerful organizations, is hard to explain. It is equally hard to 
understand how, in light of this policy, we can tolerate lawyers working in-house for corporate clients 
where the lawyer’s job and her conditions of employment are at the mercy of the company’s control 
persons. 
 150. See supra text accompanying note 147. 
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which are reproduced on its website.151 One advantage of not being a law 
firm is that Axiom can be owned and managed by nonlawyers. That 
means it can raise money in the capital markets, which law firms cannot 
do.152 To an outsider, Axiom looks like a law firm, and it does not seek to 
dispel that impression. Its website, despite avoidance of the term “law 
firm” in its own voice, conveys the impression that it is a law firm, 
including by reproducing news stories so labeling it.153 So it has the best 
of two worlds. It manages to present itself as a law firm—now with a staff 
of 700 in eleven offices globally—while also enjoying the capital 
formation options available to for-profit enterprises. And by virtue of the 
temporary agency ethics opinions, its lawyers are able to form and 
disband teams unencumbered by the conflict rules that can hamper 
movement of traditional lawyers.154 Nor is Axiom beholden to a 
jurisdiction’s rules on lawyer advertising, although its lawyers are.155 
The doctrinal underpinnings for Axiom’s business model likely 
would not have been sufficient to sustain it at its present size were it not 
for technology and the insignificance of place that technology makes 
possible. That is, in the pre-Internet era, Axiom lawyers might have 
needed temporarily to relocate physically to do a job efficiently, creating 
unauthorized practice risks. For some, that need likely would have 
precluded the arrangement or been personally disruptive. While that 
could still be so for some projects, technology means that a “temporary” 
or project-based law firm need not exist in physical space. 
It is too soon to know if Axiom itself will survive or grow. But the 
business model has appeal.156 It offers “money people” a way to invest in 
the law industry. For lawyers, work via Axiom is not necessarily a full 
time job. This can be attractive to lawyers who need or want flexible 
schedules because of other work (or creative endeavors) or demands on 
 
 151. See, e.g., Steven T. Taylor, Tomorrow: A Sneak Preview: For These Firms the Future Is Now, 
L. Practice, Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 38 (“In 2000 Harris and an entrepreneur friend, Alec Guettel, co-
founded Axiom Law—a very different law firm with a very different business model.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 152. Model Rules of Professional Conduct R. 5.4 (2010). 
 153. See supra note 151. 
 154. See supra text accompanying note 147. 
 155. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.1–7.5 (2010). 
 156. Other startups also have identified ways to bring investor capital to the legal services market. 
See, e.g., Jonathan O’Connell, Outside GC Joins Rush to Offer Discount Legal Services in Washington, 
Wash. Post (May 22, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/outside-gc-joins-
rush-to-offer-discount-legal-services-in-washington/2011/05/19/AF4MWF9G_story.html; Jonathan 
O’Connell, New Washington Law Firm Looks to Break the Billable-Hour Mold, Wash. Post, (May 8, 
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/new-washington-law-firm-looks-to-break- 
the-billable-hour-mold/2011/05/05/AFYl4sRG_story.html (reporting on Clearspire Law, PLLC). One 
challenge to this model is that the availability of work depends on the volume and type of assignments 
to the company. A law firm may carry lawyers whose skills are not in high demand at the moment, but 
companies like Axiom pay for actual work, which means the work has to be there. 
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their time (for instance, caring for children) or because they are 
semiretired or between jobs. 
2. Reverse Publishers 
In 1994, a young lawyer named Dov Seidman formed Legal Research 
Network (today called LRN),157 which offered a way for clients to save 
money on legal research. Not only would outsourcing the research to 
LRN be cheaper than paying law firm rates, but the work might then be 
shared with other paying clients, reducing the cost to each.158  
Say a client wants a memorandum on one of the following subjects 
in multiple jurisdictions: Can an employer choose to exclude smokers 
and enforce the ban with testing? What are the limits on expiration of 
gift certificates? What are the federal and state laws concerning the sale 
of leads collected on a website? These are generic questions but focused 
on specific conduct. A client can ask a law firm to do the research, pay 
for it, and own it. That indeed was the traditional method. Put aside 
whether the firm can resell the same research to another client (and at 
what price). If the question is not too specialized, it is certainly possible 
that another company will pose it to a different law firm and then pay for 
the same research. Alternatively, another company might not be willing 
to commission the work elsewhere but would be happy to pay for a copy 
of the original memorandum at a reduced cost. And the first client might 
be willing to allow that if it meant a lower price and if the work was 
stripped of confidential information. 
At one time, LRN’s website identified each of the research topics 
just discussed as the subject of an actual client memorandum. The 
company no longer appears to offer legal research services—and the 
website no longer contains these examples—but other companies do the 
same work and also identify sharing as a way to reduce cost.159 Think of 
this as reverse publishing. While a traditional publisher will print a 
 
 157. LRN, http://www.lrn.com (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). Today, LRN’s website offers ethics and 
compliance training for companies. How We Help Organizations: Building Culture from the Ground 
Up, LRN, http://www.lrn.com/how-we-help-organizations/lrn-communication-education (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2012). 
 158. D.M. Osborne, Should You Be Afraid of This Man?, Am. Lawyer, June 1995, at 111. This 
article, a profile of Seidman and his then-fledgling company, also describes its plan for “repackaging 
research and selling it in what Seidman terms the aftermarket. Thus future sales of memos—or 
portions of memos—can make up for the loss leaders of today.” Id. 
 159. Legal Research Center offers to sell “existing multijurisdictional surveys in our growing 
library.” Multijurisdictional Surveys, Legal Res. Center, http://www.legalresearch.com/services-and-
products/research-and-writing/multijurisdictional-surveys.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). National 
Legal Research Group, Inc., offers “legal research white papers” for purchase. Purchase Legal Research 
White Papers, Nat’l Legal Res. Group, http://www.nlrg.com/legal-content/legal-whitepapers-for-
purchase/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). One paper, which costs $50, is entitled Employer and Law Firm 
Website Liability, Nat’l Legal Res. Group, http://www.nlrg.com/legal-content/employer-and-law-firm-
website-liability/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
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number of books and hope for enough buyers to pay production costs 
and a profit, reverse publishers do the opposite. The first client to 
authorize the work may be willing to let the reverse publisher promote 
its resale (without revealing the identity of the client) on an as-ordered 
basis. The charge to the client likely will be lower than if it requested the 
same research from a traditional law firm for its exclusive use, both 
because the research costs can be lower and because the reverse 
publisher may be able to amortize that cost among other prospective 
buyers. (It will have to estimate how many those may be.) When an 
order comes in, a reverse publisher can ask an expert to do the research 
on a freelance basis, or it can use its own staff. For this to work, the 
questions cannot be too specialized. The reverse publisher can keep the 
memorandum on file for years and update it as needed in response to 
new requests. It can even encourage additional buyers and print copies to 
order. 
Now, a reverse publisher need not be a law firm. But when it 
answers questions like those cited here, it is selling legal knowledge as 
conventionally understood. It can avoid the rigors of unauthorized 
practice rules if it does not apply the fruits of its research to the 
particular facts confronting the client.160 The memorandum, though made 
to order, is like a book—a very specialized book—but not law practice. 
Law firms and corporate legal departments may use these research 
companies to save money. And because a reverse publisher is not a law 
firm, it can seek lay investors and have nonlawyer managers. 
And yet we cannot ignore the fact that this nonlaw firm has created 
a supply chain that provides legal advice. The authors of the research 
memoranda are unlikely to be lawyers in the jurisdiction in which the 
ultimate clients reside. They are selling their legal skills to an entity in 
the form of a product and the firm then sells that product in the form of a 
memorandum to clients, most likely through the clients’ lawyers. If the 
authors sold the same memorandum to the ultimate recipient directly, 
they would risk a charge of unauthorized law practice.161 But because of 
the intermediaries between the creator and final user of the work, and 
because the memoranda answer generic (but nonetheless focused) 
questions, somehow, magically, rules governing lawyers and law practice 
are not a threat. Care must be taken not to make the question too 
specific to the situation of the client in order to avoid any claim that the 
 
 160. It also avoids the risk of unauthorized practice of law if it funnels its research through the 
client’s law firm or general counsel’s office. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, 
Formal Op. 451 (2008) (noting that a lawyer’s supervision of outsourced work will avoid an unauthorized 
law practice claim). 
 161. See Crain v. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm., 11 S.W.3d 328, 333 (Tex. App. 1999) 
(“The practice of law embraces, in general, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters 
connected with the law.”). 
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intermediary is practicing law (or that the researchers are in law practice 
with nonlawyers). But a reverse publisher has the same interest. If the 
question is too specific it will be of interest to only one buyer and the 
economies of scale that inspire this business and make it efficient and 
profitable will be lost. 
If an organization can be a back-office legal research arm of an in-
house corporate law department or a law firm, and I can see no rule that 
prevents it, then legal research can also be outsourced abroad. We can 
imagine a new generation of LPO organizations.162 There is no need for 
the entity or the researchers to be in the United States or for the 
researchers to be U.S. lawyers. The researchers need not be lawyers at all 
if the market will accept them. This is certainly true if the organization is 
working through a lawyer intermediary who at least nominally is 
supervising (taking responsibility for) the work; and it is probably true—
at least if the assignment is general enough—even if the organization is 
working directly for the ultimate user. If the researcher is located abroad, 
there is little or nothing a U.S. court can do to stop her in any event 
although it might have jurisdiction over the company for which she 
works. The market will identify whether it has confidence in the quality 
of the work, which encourages legal research organizations, whether 
domestic or foreign, to use credentialed researchers.163 
3. Multidisciplinary Practice 
In the space where lawyers and nonlawyers may do the same things, 
lawyers have the option of taking their work out of a law firm and 
relocating it in a different setting. Tax lawyers have long been willing, if 
the incentives are strong, to take their skills to accounting firms.164 These 
 
 162. And indeed, LPOs have moved into the field of legal research. See supra text accompanying 
notes 138–139; see also Legal Research and Drafting, Integreon, (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.integreon.com/ 
solutions/legal-solutions/legal-research-drafting.html. Integreon, an LPO, offers legal research services, 
describing the work this way: 
  Working with Integreon’s onshore or offshore lawyers, you can accelerate legal research 
and even reduce costs up to 50% by using offshore resources. By integrating a dedicated 
Integreon legal research team into your corporate legal department or as an extension of 
your firm, you benefit from a truly global legal talent pool spread across four continents.  
  Our onshore research specialists have a range of domain experience and excellent online 
research skills. Our dedicated teams of offshore lawyers have work experience at law firms, 
in corporate legal departments, or in private practice in India, the Philippines, the U.S., and 
the U.K. 
 163. It bespeaks the fluid nature of the new categories of entities that deliver legal services that 
legal research companies can be viewed as nonlaw firms selling law or as LPOs providing research aid 
to an ultimate client through their lawyers. What puts some of these companies closer to the first 
category is the fact that the memoranda are written by lawyers and the fact that the memoranda need 
be absorbed into the work product of the lawyer who requests it but can themselves be an end 
product. 
 164. See Randall S. Thomas et al., Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 115, 171–79 (2001). 
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transplanted lawyers cannot hold themselves out as doing legal work—
although they can truthfully identify their credentials, including their law 
degree and even bar membership165—and cannot represent clients in 
work that only lawyers can do (because lawyers cannot sell legal services 
via for-profit vehicles that are not law firms166), but their legal training 
may provide a competitive advantage and support hourly rates equal to 
or greater than what they might have charged in law practice.167 
What has worked in tax practice should work elsewhere. Take, for 
example, multidisciplinary practice. The ABA rejected a multidisciplinary 
practice proposal that would have allowed lawyers to invite nonlawyers 
to join law firms and offer its clients services in addition to legal 
services.168 But nothing stops lawyers from joining entities that are not 
law firms and partnering with nonlawyers, so long as the service they 
offer is not within the lawyers’ monopoly. One candidate for realignment 
may be compliance work.169 This service looks a lot like law and may skirt 
closely to the lawyers’ realm—after all, compliance with what?—but it is 
apparently sufficiently distinct to avoid claims of unauthorized practice.170 
Perhaps that is because defining a rule’s requirements (which is legal 
work) is not the same as implementing the requirement (which is 
compliance). 
Withal, whether it is the tax practitioner or some new hybrid service 
(part law, part not), the client is getting the benefit of a lawyer’s training 
and judgment even if she does not call herself a lawyer and even if her 
organization is not a law firm. Not to be overlooked, however, is the fact 
that the work that flows to the organization might otherwise have gone 
to a traditional law firm. 
D. The Law of Anyplace 
This Subpart differs from the earlier discussions of lawyers without 
borders.171 That discussion posited that the physical location of the lawyer 
has receded (not disappeared) as a useful basis for regulation. Here I 
 
 165. See Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 139 (1994) (holding that a 
lawyer has a First Amendment right to refer in her advertising to her certification as a financial 
planner and public accountant). 
 166. See, e.g., Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4 (2010) (forbidding lawyers to join in a 
partnership or practice in a professional corporation that practices law if a nonlawyer is a partner or 
has an ownership interest in the corporation). 
 167. Lawyers who are not in law practice are not subject to the limitations the ethics rules impose 
on legal fees. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.5 (2010). 
 168. See Paul D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and Reviving 
the MDP Debate in America, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 2193, 2203 (2010). 
 169. See Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1397, 1397–
1400 (2006). 
 170. See id. at 1407–11. 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 79–110. 
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propose that the governing law also has receded as a useful basis for 
regulation. The two predicates—law and place—are distinct. The lawyer 
may be in a virtual place, which means the lawyer can be anywhere 
physically. Separately, the law that informs the lawyer’s work may have 
no connection to the place where the lawyer is. Of course, law, like place, 
remains a factor in lawyer regulation. A lawyer has to be some place, and 
the law of a place (though not the place the lawyer is), must be an 
ingredient in the legal service to which the lawyer’s work contributes. 
The premise, however, is that what the law is, like where the lawyer’s 
place is, has declining utility to the goals of regulation, including 
licensure. 
Three interrelated developments have diminished the importance of 
home-state law in the inventory of many lawyers and have thereby 
contributed to the fading of the law of a place, along with the fading of 
place itself, as a useful and effective organizing principle for regulation of 
the bar. These developments are: (1) increasing homogeneity and 
accessibility of law, (2) increasing lawyer specialization, and (3) the long-
standing ability of contracting parties to choose what law will govern 
their agreement, the identity and nature of the tribunal that will resolve 
any disputes under it, and the location of that tribunal. To appreciate the 
import of these factors, we have to go back some decades. 
Recall that before the present day (and still), we allowed lawyers 
from anywhere to try a case anywhere through the vehicle of pro hac vice 
admission.172 Not all courts were equally inviting173—with some state 
courts, and most federal courts especially, generally willing to admit 
lawyers pro hac vice174—but over time pro hac vice admission became 
increasingly available as a matter of grace if not as a matter of right. 
Admission for the trial of a case is an early example of cross-border 
practice authority. Under the ABA Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice 
Admission, a pro hac vice applicant must satisfy certain criteria, 
including familiarity with local court rules, and may need a home-state 
minder, a local lawyer willing to accept responsibility for and to join in 
the work of the applicant.175 It was no impediment that the issues before 
the host tribunal did not arise under the law of the lawyer’s home state. 
Whatever the governing law, which need not be the host-state law, the 
lawyer would need to know it, just as she would need to know local 
 
 172. See Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission (2002). Every American state and the District 
of Columbia has a pro hac vice rule, which vary in liberality. See ABA, Pro Hac Vice Admission 
Rules (2011). 
 173. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 438 (1978) (upholding Ohio’s refusal to admit New York 
lawyers to defend a criminal case in Ohio). 
 174. See Fuller v. Diesslin, 868 F.2d 604, 605 (3d Cir. 1989). In criminal cases, some courts have 
ruled that a defendant has a constitutional right to employ an out-of-state lawyer. See United States v. 
Garrett, 179 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 175. See Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice Admission (2002). 
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procedure. The pro hac vice regime treats the lawyer’s trial skills and the 
client’s interest in counsel of choice as deserving great respect with little 
need formally to test the lawyer’s knowledge of substantive law or 
procedural law of the host jurisdiction. After all, even in the lawyer’s 
home state, a case may turn on the law of another jurisdiction and yet no 
one doubted the right of an admitted lawyer to try a case in her home 
state. The host-state litigation could be quite significant—a serious, even 
a capital, felony. Public interest also favors the practice.176 The nation has 
looked to the availability of out-of-state lawyers as an antidote to local 
hostility to a cause or party, as was true during the civil rights era of the 
1960s.177 
Pro hac vice admission means we have long had a high comfort level 
with a lawyer’s cross-border practice in host-state forums and with non-
home-state law. But it was limited to trial work and appeals (and work 
ancillary to a pending court proceeding) and presumed the presence of 
an adversary, usually a local lawyer as co-counsel, and a judge, all of 
whom could guard against a guest lawyer’s misbehavior or ignorance. 
Initially pushing the boundaries of this comfort level were out-of-
state lawyers who entered a host jurisdiction in connection with work for 
which no pro hac vice authority was available. That work included all 
transactional work and work in anticipation of litigation not yet pending 
(and which might never be filed in the host state or anywhere), work in 
connection with litigation pending elsewhere, work of lawyers who were 
assisting a lawyer admitted pro hac vice, and (as in Birbrower) work in 
connection with arbitration or other noncourt tribunals that lacked the 
power to grant pro hac vice status. In each instance, an out-of-state 
lawyer is in a host state, acting as a lawyer, in connection with work 
where the governing law may be host-state law, home-state law, or the 
law of a third place. So we have temporary presence for a matter but 
without judicial approval. For a long time, this temporary cross-border 
practice lacked any official status beyond the occasional court opinion 
seeking to define its limits in a particular setting.178 ABA Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct 5.5, adopted in some form in many jurisdictions, 
has now recognized what had been happening anyway and, in a national 
 
 176. See Flynt, 439 U.S. at 450 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (identifying times in American history that 
the availability of out-of-state lawyers has served important values). After Hurricane Katrina hit New 
Orleans, the ABA adopted a model rule that enables out-of-state lawyers to come to the site of a 
disaster to help with legal needs pro bono without running afoul of unauthorized practice rules. The 
rule also allows lawyers whose practices have been disrupted by the disaster to enter other states to 
continue their practices during the pendency of the disaster. See Model Court Rule on Provision of 
Legal Servs. Following Determination of Major Disaster (2007). 
 177. See Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392, 395 (E.D. La. 1968). 
 178. See El Gemayel v. Seaman, 533 N.E.2d 245, 249 (N.Y. 1988) (exemplifying a court’s effort to 
define the scope of extraterritorial practice). 
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economy, would continue to happen beyond the power of any state to 
impede it.179 The question is whether Rule 5.5 is too restrictive. 
Restriction of practice to locally admitted lawyers makes most sense 
when the licensing jurisdiction can plausibly differentiate its law from the 
law elsewhere. A purpose of licensing is to ensure competence in the law 
of the place. If the law were the same nationwide, as federal law is, then 
competence one place should be transferable to all places. But if a 
jurisdiction’s law is special, it can claim that competence elsewhere 
proves little or nothing. Knowing the rules for estate planning or the 
statute of frauds in State A doesn’t mean you know these things in State 
B (although, of course, you could look it up). 
That claim has diminishing weight today for interlocking reasons 
that subordinate the importance of knowledge of local law as a basis for 
regulation. Federal courts will admit lawyers who are not lawyers in the 
states in which they sit.180 That in turn raises the fascinating, but so far 
mainly theoretical, question: Can a state prevent an unadmitted lawyer 
from opening an office—an announced physical presence—in the state if 
her practice is limited to work in a local federal court in which she is 
admitted, at least when the federal court has adopted a rule permitting 
it? A negative answer, perhaps based on the Supremacy Clause or other 
constitutional provision, will put a big dent in state authority physically 
to exclude lawyers not licensed by the state. The little existing authority 
on this point suggests the answer is that a state may be powerless to 
prevent the conduct if federal courts wish to allow it.181 
 
 179. The rule permits temporary practice in a “host” state under four circumstances: 
A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended 
from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in this 
jurisdiction that: 
(1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this 
jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter; 
(2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this 
or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law 
or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized; 
(3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other 
alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise 
out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer 
is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice 
admission; or 
(4) are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to 
the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice. 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5(c) (2010).  
 180. See, e.g., N. Dist. Ill. R. 83.10 (“An applicant for admission to the bar of this Court must be a 
member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of any state of the United States or of the 
District of Columbia.”). 
 181. See, e.g., Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d 520, 533 (3rd Cir. 2006) (holding that a Pennsylvania 
lawyer suspended by state courts could continue to maintain an office in the state for the purpose of 
practicing in federal court, where he was not suspended); In re Desilets, 291 F.3d 925, 931 (6th Cir. 
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Beyond uniform federal law is the perception that in many areas, 
the laws of the states are increasingly alike. While the trend may be near 
impossible to measure with precision, causes of the convergence may lie 
in uniform state law efforts, the influence of American Legal Institute’s 
Restatements, and the fact that electronic research has given advocates 
and judges easy access to decisions of all U.S. jurisdictions. True, some 
local variations resist the tendency toward homogenization. These may 
include land transfers, local tax law, and family law. Procedural law and 
rules of evidence may also vary, but less than one might think given the 
influence of the federal rules of procedure and the federal rules of 
evidence.182 In any event, the importance of procedural and evidentiary 
differences has already been fully discounted by acceptance of pro hac 
vice admission to try a case. Trials are where procedure and evidence 
rules do their work. Further, variations in local law are easily located 
through electronic research. Even where a jurisdiction can claim that its 
rule on a topic is unusual—say, when an anticipatory breach of contract 
will excuse performance or the implied obligations of a commercial 
lessor to provide a particular service—the difference can be easily 
discovered, especially by a lawyer who concentrates in that area of law. 
The fact that technology, as earlier discussed, makes the law of nearly 
any place available anyplace without need for a brick and mortar law 
library, enhances the ability of a specialist to quickly identify 
jurisdictional variations in the law of her specialty. 
Specialization in legal fields is a complement to the movement 
toward conformity of law. It should be self-evident that a UCC expert in 
Ohio will know more about the UCC in Indiana than will the products 
liability expert in Indiana, who in turn will know more about products 
liability in Ohio than will the Ohio criminal defense lawyer. That is to 
say, each lawyer will be better able to get up to speed on (be competent 
in) the law in the other jurisdiction in her area of specialization than will 
the home-state lawyer with a different specialty. Specialists know what 
variations to look for, if any. I’m a dilettante in most legal fields but I 
know a lot about one field—the law and rules governing the legal 
profession. It is, I hope, not arrogance to think that I, a New York lawyer, 
 
2002) (holding that an attorney who was admitted to a federal district court in Michigan but not the 
state bar and who had an office in Michigan was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in 
Michigan and was entitled to fees from the Michigan bankruptcy court). 
 182. Deborah Jones Merritt & Ric Simmons, Learning Evidence: From the Federal Rules to 
the Courtroom 24 (2009) (“[M]ore than forty states have adopted state codes that are nearly 
identical—in language and numbering—to the Federal Rules.”); Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, 
and Erie, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 877, 922 n.181 (2011) (“[A]fter the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, many state courts adopted the Federal Rules nearly in toto, and the basic vision of the 
Federal Rules—liberal pleading, broad discovery, generous joinder, and so on—has exercised an 
influence even on those states that did not adopt the Rules.”). 
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am better able to advise a law firm in Virginia on issues in my field than 
are most Virginia lawyers, just as many Virginia lawyers are better able 
than am I to advise New Yorkers in other areas of New York law. 
Specialization overcompensates for deviations in local law. Of course, 
there are Virginia lawyers who are also expert in my field of 
concentration. A Virginia lawyer need not reach out to a New Yorker, 
but that will not always be true. A client in a small community may be 
unable to find a lawyer with a particular specialty in his city and may 
desire to consult one in a neighboring state. Or a Richmond law firm may 
not want a local lawyer to know too much about its business. Once, a 
lawyer’s specialty was defined by the law of the state of admission—that 
is to say, by geography. You were a New York lawyer or a Texas lawyer 
and your specialty was New York or Texas law, or some part of it. My 
claim is that today specialization is increasingly defined by expertise in 
areas of law and that this development is marginalizing the utility of 
political and geographical boundaries as the exclusive or even the 
dominant basis for defining competence. 
Beyond homogenization of local law and the leveling influence of 
specialization, a third factor diminishing the importance of knowledge of 
a particular jurisdiction’s law as a basis for regulation is the nearly 
unlimited power of contracting parties to decide what law, if any, will 
govern their disputes and in what forum and at what location those 
disputes will be heard.183 If the dispute will be heard in a noncourt 
tribunal, as with arbitration, the parties can say nothing about the 
governing law, designate a particular jurisdiction’s law, authorize the 
arbitrator to choose the law, or even direct the arbitrator to rule as she 
deems fair,184 which is about as far from our understanding of what law is 
as one can get without flipping a coin. An American company 
headquartered in Seattle and a German company headquartered in 
Frankfurt may contract for a project in China with disputes heard in 
arbitration in Singapore under the law of New York or general legal 
principles. 
E. The Sum of the Parts 
We can have law without either lawyers or law firms. On our laptops 
or in a “cloud,” we can carry a vast law library and any documents we 
may require for our work. Even without a laptop, we can access the same 
material from anywhere in the world with an Internet connection and 
easily available programs. We can communicate from anyplace with 
anyone, anywhere, in text, video, or voice. Our physical location can be 
 
 183. 2 Martin Domke, Domke on Commercial Arbitration §§ 30:1–30:6 (2010). 
 184. Id. §§ 30:1–30:2; Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 
1, 17 (Cal. 1998) (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
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hidden from, or in any event not revealed to, anyone, including courts, 
clients, adversaries, and regulators. Within modest limits we can agree to 
resolve disputes anywhere, before anyone we choose, under any law we 
select or no specified law. The law anywhere is growing closer to the law 
everywhere else, and federal law, increasingly prominent, is the same 
everywhere. The federal government and federal courts can override 
local control of law practice. Specialized knowledge will often define the 
borders of a lawyer’s competence with greater assurance than will the 
geographical borders of his licensing jurisdiction. Lawyers who represent 
parties in arbitration are not, in the view of at least three courts, 
practicing law even though the arbitrator may be charged to apply the 
law of a particular place and her ruling will finally determine the legal 
rights of the parties. These things are true and, in ways we cannot fully 
predict, will become more pronounced in the years ahead as information 
technology becomes still more sophisticated, as national and 
international borders recede as impediments to commerce, and as 
geographical discrepancies in the cost of legal services and legal support 
services encourage the growth of new categories and sources of law 
workers and new businesses to house them. The traditional model of 
lawyer regulation cannot expect to police this new world. It can pretend 
to do so, and on rare occasions it will discover a miscreant and punish her 
as an example to others and thereby reaffirm its power and legitimacy in 
its own eyes. But it will become less effective than Prohibition-era law 
enforcement. Its power is ebbing. What, then, should enlightened 
regulators do, not because they legally must but because they should? 
In answering that question, one argument must be immediately 
repudiated: that if we do anything that recognizes these changes, we 
afford a patina of legitimacy at the expense of the American legal 
profession’s core values: confidentiality, loyalty, candor, and diligence. 
Not only is that claim false, I argue that the opposite is true. Doing 
nothing threatens these values because by ignoring the accelerating 
changes at play, we fail to regulate against the abuses these changes may 
bring, just as any economic activity is capable of causing both good and 
ill. To put it another way, the cry we must heed is not for less regulation 
of the profession, but rather for new regulation of the burgeoning ways 
that legal services are sold. That these changes bring with them new 
forms of competition with established distribution channels and the 
lawyers who populate them, and that they undoubtedly will lead to 
financial disappointment and professional dislocation for many lawyers 
while empowering others and offering possible benefits to clients in the 
form of lower costs and greater efficiency, seems indisputable. It is not a 
trend, I submit, that we can vote down. Indeed, insofar as the changes 
make legal services more accessible and affordable while protecting core 
values, our social responsibility requires us to welcome them. But if the 
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illusion that we can stop the changes leads to inaction, we do threaten the 
very core values we claim to protect. 
IV.  What Should We Do? Eleven Recommendations 
for Change (with Qualifications) 
Any proposals must address this question: Who will be allowed to 
participate in the law business, in what capacity, from where, and with 
what protections for clients, the justice system, and the profession’s core 
values? The eleven recommendations that follow are offered as a way to 
start a conversation. None is inflexible. 
A. Create a Single Bar Examination with Separate State Scoring185 
Similarities in much of the law of U.S. jurisdictions make separate 
state bar examinations presumptively unnecessary. Indeed, for the 
reasons discussed,186 it is far less important to identify knowledge of 
particular legal rules, or variations on them, among jurisdictions, than a 
knowledge of the legal concepts generally and demonstrated ability to 
work through legal and factual problems in a way we understand as 
“doing law” or “thinking like a lawyer.” Such knowledge can be tested 
without requiring the applicant to know any state’s particular position on 
an issue. It is important to be able to identify issues latent in a fact 
pattern and to research their resolution under the law of the jurisdiction 
whose law applies (as well as to identify which jurisdiction’s law applies). 
It tells us nothing useful about an applicant’s qualification for the bar 
that she has (temporarily) memorized the particular way the testing 
jurisdiction has resolved one or another issue. 
This proposal comes with three qualifications. First, different 
jurisdictions may wish to set different passing scores for the single bar 
examination I support. We know today that different states have 
different bar passage rates187 and employ different scoring for multistate 
examinations now in use.188 State A may want to set the admission bar 
higher than does State B. Below I will recommend national motion 
admission—a procedure that will allow a lawyer admitted in any U.S. 
jurisdiction to relocate her practice to another U.S. jurisdiction. 
However, I will recommend limitations on motion admission. We do not 
want to encourage applicants to take the examination in a state with a 
lower passing score on a uniform examination and then to seek 
immediately to convert their passage into admission in a state with the 
 
 185. Whether the examination is called a uniform bar examination or a national bar examination 
or something else is unimportant. The National Organization of Bar Counsel has chosen “uniform” 
apparently because it is more readily accepted. 
 186. See supra text accompanying notes 45–55. 
 187. See Nat’l Conference of Bar Examiners, 2009 Statistics (2010). 
 188. Id. 
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higher score they failed to achieve. That would undermine the legitimate 
policy of the second state. 
The second qualification on this proposal is to entertain the 
possibility that a state may have good reasons to test some aspects of its 
local law and wish to supplement the national bar examination by testing 
local law knowledge. Frankly, I doubt that any state, save perhaps 
Louisiana,189 could justify a supplementary examination and I would be 
skeptical of any such claim. But I leave open the possibility. While a 
supplemental local law examination for new lawyers may be justified, I 
argue below that one would not be defensible for lawyers practicing for a 
stated period of time elsewhere and who wish to relocate.190 
Last, every jurisdiction would have the right to conduct a character 
investigation of any applicant, whether a new lawyer or a relocating one. 
B. Permit Lawyers to Physically Relocate Their Practice from One 
Jurisdiction to Another Without Retaking the Bar Examination 
Lawyers who have been in active practice for a period of years 
should be able to relocate their practices to any other U.S. jurisdiction 
without need to take a bar examination. This is now the rule in all but 
eleven U.S. jurisdictions.191 The ABA Model Motion Admission Rule 
envisions a requirement of five years of active practice in the previous 
seven years.192 A requirement of three of the last seven years would 
accommodate the demands of parenthood, for example, without 
threatening the goals of the rules. But whatever the temporal requirement, 
I urge the nationalization of this avenue of admission, as has occurred in 
Canada193 and among nations in the European Union.194 Lawyers who do 
not satisfy the temporal requirement should be permitted to relocate 
without taking a further bar examination if their score on the uniform 
bar examination is equal to or greater than the passing score for entering 
lawyers in the jurisdiction to which they wish to relocate. There would 
seem to be a strong constitutional claim to be able to do so.195 
 
 189. Louisiana is “the only U.S. jurisdiction with a predominantly civil law tradition.” Gerald 
Korngold, Globalizing Conservation Easements: Private Law Approaches for International 
Environmental Protection, 28 Wis. Int’l L.J. 585, 620 (2011) (discussing the Louisiana Civil Code). 
 190. See infra text accompanying notes 191–196. 
 191. See supra note 54. 
 192. The ABA rule also permits tacking experience and has a generous definition of full time 
practice. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Model Rule on Admission by Motion, ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ethics2020/aomissuepaper.authcheckdam.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 193. See Fed’n of Law Societies of Can., National Mobility Agreement (2002), available at 
http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/becoming/mobility_agreement_aug02[1].pdf. 
 194. The EU rule applies across nations with different legal systems, not merely within a single 
nation. See Christine R. Davis, Approaching Reform: The Future of Multijurisdictional Practice in 
Today’s Legal Profession, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1339, 1357–59 (2002). 
 195. See Perlman, supra note 12, at 159. 
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A further examination of the relocating lawyer would be defensible 
in two circumstances: if the lawyer’s scores on the uniform examination 
were lower than the new jurisdiction then demanded of new applicants, 
unless the lawyer satisfies the temporal requirements; or in the unlikely 
event that the new jurisdiction can justify supplementing the uniform 
examination with one testing local law for all applicants, as described 
earlier.196 
C. Permit a Lawyer Admitted in any U.S. Jurisdiction to Practice 
Virtually in any Other Jurisdiction Within the Scope of Her 
Competence 
A dramatic consequence of the Internet is that law firms (like other 
businesses) can as a practical matter sell their services nationwide 
without leaving home. Virtual presence can be as or nearly as intrusive 
on a host jurisdiction as physical presence, which is to say that, from afar, 
a lawyer in any state can have a vibrant practice in any other state for 
certain kinds of work. Lawyers in cities near or on the border with an 
adjacent state are especially positioned to practice this way because if the 
need arises to consult with their clients in person, they can travel to the 
client or (if especially cautious) ask the client to come to them. Kansas 
City, Kansas, and Kansas City, Missouri, are prime examples. Others 
include Philadelphia, Boston, New York, Memphis, Portland, Omaha, 
Chicago, Fargo, and Washington, D.C. Where the need for in-person 
consultation is absent or limited, a lawyer’s virtual practice can be 
national. Advertising on the Internet, which is cheap and ubiquitous, 
facilitates this business model for lawyers who can credibly claim a 
particular expertise that will appeal to clients elsewhere. Nor can we 
expect easily to be able to enforce rules forbidding attorney-client 
relationships in cyberspace. This is consensual activity often impelled by 
rational considerations on both sides. Unless lawyer and client have a 
falling out and the client wants to assert a claim of unauthorized practice 
to gain leverage in a fee dispute, the practice will defy detection. The 
Internet invites a market defined by reputation, price, and competence, 
not geography. A virtual market also undercuts the ability of states to 
use physical location as the basis for control. 
I suggest that lawyers should be allowed to form attorney-client 
relationships on the Internet, subject to qualifications.197 First, by 
entering a jurisdiction virtually, including through representation or 
solicitation of the jurisdiction’s residents, a lawyer will subject herself to 
the disciplinary and judicial authority of the jurisdiction for claims arising 
 
 196. See supra text accompanying notes 53–55. 
 197. It is easier to accept this proposal once we have accepted the recommendation for generous 
motion admission described above. See supra notes 191–96. 
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out of the lawyer’s virtual presence there.198 She may be deemed to have 
appointed an appropriate state officer as her agent for service of process. 
Second, the lawyer’s home state should commit itself to accept any 
factual findings, legal (or ethical) conclusions, and sanctions imposed by 
the host state’s disciplinary authorities, subject only to the usual 
limitations on full faith and credit owed judicial judgments of a sister 
state.199 In this way, a lawyer cannot misbehave, confident that she can 
avoid a home-state sanction for her conduct. Third, any lawyer entering a 
host jurisdiction virtually must identify her jurisdictional limitations 
(“member of the bar of State A only”) and the name and address of the 
regulatory authority in her home state to which complaints can be 
directed. 
Finally, most challenging is the situation where the virtual presence 
is not casual and episodic but rather continuous and substantial, whether 
or not by design. I have in mind the possibility that a lawyer in State A 
will seek to expand her practice to attract clients in neighboring State B 
through advertising and solicitations aimed specifically at them. Or 
without intending it, a State A lawyer’s virtual practice may become 
significantly populated with State B clients. Virtual presence can, past a 
point, be the functional equivalent of physical presence. We should not 
allow a lawyer physically to open a law practice in State B without formal 
admission of some kind.200 When the lawyer’s virtual practice in State B 
can be said, whether by design or happenstance, to equal physical 
presence, we should also require admission.201 Of course, like much in 
law, the question will turn on degree. 
 
 198. This is already anticipated in Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.5 cmt. 4 (2010) and in 
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(a). I address solicitation and advertising infra text 
accompanying notes 202–204. 
 199. The current ABA recommendation envisions something close to this regime, but has 
exceptions that should be narrowed. See Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement R.22 
(2002). The host state cannot, of course, suspend or disbar the lawyer, but it can find that the same 
conduct would warrant either sanction if the lawyer were admitted in the host state, and such a finding 
should be recognized in the home state. The concern that out-of-state lawyers might meet harsher 
sanctions than in-state lawyers, a surmise at best, can be addressed in a defense to home-state 
enforcement. 
 200. It can be full admission by motion or after passing required examinations, or it can be 
admission through state B’s in-house counsel rule. An in-house counsel rule allows an out-of-state 
lawyer to practice law from an office location within a state without having to gain admission to the 
state’s bar, but limits the lawyer to work for her organizational employer and its affiliated companies 
and does not entitle the lawyer to appear in court. See, e.g., N.Y. Ct. App R. 522.1–522.7. 
 201. A lawyer who could gain permanent admission in State B through motion admission might 
prefer not to do so to avoid bar dues or State B’s (possibly more demanding) CLE requirements. State 
B might also require lawyers admitted to its bar to have an office in the state, as some states already 
require, see infra text accompanying note 205, and the lawyer may not wish to open a second office. I 
suggest below that an office requirement as a condition of motion admission has little value. See infra 
text accompanying note 205. 
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D. To Accommodate Cross-Border Legal Advertising, Create a 
Uniform Rule Identifying Minimum Standards and Disclosure 
Requirements 
The advertising rules in U.S. jurisdictions are greatly dissimilar.202 
The need for uniformity in advertising rules is underscored by the 
national reach of legal ads, especially but not only on the Internet. It is 
neither practical nor necessary to require legal ads to conform to all state 
variations. The answer may be different for a solicitation targeted at 
specific potential clients. State rules can require that solicitations of state 
residents respect the state’s solicitation rules, thereby treating out-of-
state and in-state lawyers equally. So a rule that imposes a waiting period 
before contact with a prospective client with a personal injury claim 
would apply to all lawyers.203 But advertisements, on the other hand, are 
not targeted, they are generic. 
A uniform rule for cross-border legal advertisements should require, 
in addition to appropriate disclaimers and a prohibition against false or 
misleading statements, that such advertisements contain the name and 
contact information of the lawyer or firm responsible for the 
advertisement, the name and location of the advertiser’s regulatory 
authority, and the jurisdictional limitations of the advertiser, if an 
individual. If the advertiser is a law firm, its ad should identify the 
jurisdictions in which its lawyers are admitted.204 If states are unable to 
agree on a uniform rule, then the rule should be that an advertisement 
satisfies the rules in any jurisdiction if it satisfies the rules in the 
jurisdiction in which the advertising lawyer or firm practices. 
E. Permit Motion Admission Without Requiring an Office or 
Minimum Practice in the New Jurisdiction 
Today, a state may condition the privilege of motion admission (and 
the ability to bypass the bar examination) on a requirement that the 
lawyer have an office in the state or the expectation that she will spend a 
certain amount of time representing clients in the state.205 It is doubtful 
that states scrupulously monitor their admitted lawyers to ensure that 
they continue to meet any office or practice requirements. Even 
assuming that states have power to impose a practice or office requirement 
 
 202. For variations in Rules 7.1 through 7.3, see the annotations to these rules in Stephen Gillers 
et al., Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards 418–56 (2011). 
 203. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995). 
 204. I draw here on Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 7.1 (2010). 
 205. Scariano v. Justices of Supreme Court, 38 F.3d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 1995); Goldfarb v. Supreme 
Court, 766 F.2d 859, 865 (4th Cir. 1985). But see Schoenefeld v. New York, No. 1:09–CV–00504, 
2011 WL 3957282, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2011) (holding that under the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause, the state could not require a nonresident New York lawyer to have an office in New York 
when the state did not require the same of New York residents). 
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as a condition of admission or continued admission, doing so makes little 
sense today. The fear that lawyers will collect bar admissions like 
trophies if they are liberated from practice and office requirements is 
unrealistic. They will have to pay bar or court dues in every state in 
which they are admitted and may be subject to other requirements, such 
as continuing legal education (“CLE”) requirements different or more 
demanding than those in their home jurisdictions, contributions to a 
client protection fund, and availability for court appointments. An office 
or practice requirement is an impediment to bar admission without 
corresponding benefit to the state. Lawyers are most likely to seek 
motion admission in neighboring states because they can realistically 
hope to serve clients from those states. Their offices may be closer to 
those clients than are those of lawyers in distant parts of the neighboring 
state. A northern New Jersey lawyer, for example, may wish to satisfy 
the New York motion admission rule. She is closer to New York City 
than are many lawyers located in New York State. 
F. Require Lawyers to Have Malpractice Insurance 
Requiring malpractice insurance should be simple, but the 
resistance is likely to be intense, which is itself odd—if not 
disingenuous—if easier national practice proposals are opposed on the 
ground that they subject clients to incompetent out-of-state lawyers. 
Only Oregon now mandates malpractice insurance.206 Few if any rules 
could protect clients as effectively as a rule requiring malpractice 
insurance, which at least would ensure payment of malpractice 
judgments up to the limit of the lawyer’s policy and compliance with the 
preventive measures that insurance carriers require. One objection likely 
will be that the cost of mandatory malpractice insurance will be passed 
on to clients but, if true, this also means that those lawyers who do not 
now have such insurance enjoy a market advantage. Their clients may 
not even know about the lack of insurance and most states do not require 
lawyers to tell them.207 
 
 206. Only Oregon mandates legal malpractice insurance, administered through the state bar. See 
Elizabeth Chambliss & David Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large Firms: A 
Call for Research and Reporting, 30 Hofstra L. Rev. 691, 710 & n.106 (2002). 
 207. According to the ABA, seven states require notice of malpractice coverage, if any, directly to 
clients, and eighteen states require lawyers to record this information on their annual registration 
statement. Of course, it will be the rare client who looks for the registration statement. ABA 
Standing Comm. on Client Protection, State Implementation of ABA Model Court Rule on 
Insurance Disclosure (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ 
2011_build/professional_responsibility/malprac_disc_chart.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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G. Create a Presumption That Unless Lawyer and Client Agree 
Otherwise, the Conflict Rules of the Jurisdiction in Which the 
Client Resides (or Does Business) Govern the Client’s 
Relationship with Counsel 
Model Rule 8.5 is the choice-of-law provision and purports to tell us 
which jurisdiction’s ethical rules govern in the event that a matter 
concerns more than one jurisdiction and their rules are inconsistent on a 
particular issue.208 The choice-of-rule question can and does arise today 
regardless of the lawyer’s home jurisdiction, even if it is the same as the 
client’s.209 This is because a matter may require work in two or more 
jurisdictions. A jurisdiction’s rules are meant to govern the behavior of 
lawyers who practice in it, whether they belong to its bar or are present 
temporarily.210 
Because my proposals likely will increase the frequency with which 
a client and lawyer reside and work in different places, I support a weak 
presumption that the client’s home-state conflict rules govern the 
lawyer’s conduct (unless the matter is in litigation, where the tribunal’s 
rules will always govern, although the tribunal may itself face the need to 
elect from competing rules). I limit this presumption to conflict rules, 
whose purpose is protection of clients. There would be no presumption 
when a rule is meant to protect third parties because then the jurisdiction 
in which the lawyer provides services will have an interest in the 
governing rule. Duties to a tribunal and duties to correct false statements 
in negotiation are examples of situations that implicate the interests of 
third parties.211 
I am encouraged to propose this weak presumption because the 
lawyer and client can choose to replace it with the client’s informed 
consent.212 Rule 8.5(b) can go only so far in enabling the parties to predict 
 
 208. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.5(b) (2010) provides: 
Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of 
professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows: 
(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the 
jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and 
(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct 
occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules 
of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to 
discipline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer 
reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will occur.  
(emphasis added). 
 209. Id.  
 210. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.5(a) gives a jurisdiction disciplinary authority over 
lawyers who are not admitted to its bar. Rule 8.5(b) guides the choice of rule. Rule 5.5(c) permits 
temporary practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not admitted. 
 211. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3–4.1 (2010). 
 212. Model Rules 1.7(b), 1.9(a), and 1.10(d) allow informed consent to displace their provisions, 
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which jurisdiction’s rules will govern particular conduct in a 
representation in the event of a dispute. Unavoidably, the rule states a 
standard, not a bright line. The consent provisions of the conflict rules 
permit lawyer and client to reduce the uncertainty that a standard 
necessarily creates. 
I suggest further that the parties should be able to substitute not 
merely one rule for another, but all of the conflict rules of another 
jurisdiction by name. For example, they should be able to say that “Rules 
1.7, 1.9, and 1.10 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct will govern 
this matter.” The value of doing this is even greater predictability and 
less uncertainty. They are importing not only the text of the Illinois rules 
but also the case law’s interpretation of them. Of course, any such 
agreement must have the client’s informed consent, confirmed in writing 
as Model Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10 now require to displace their provisions. 
Further, the designated jurisdiction should have a connection to the 
representation. That connection can be that the jurisdiction is where a 
substantial amount of work is reasonably expected to occur or that, 
drawing on the test in Model Rule 8.5(b), it is where the “predominant 
effect” of the representation is likely to be. The designated jurisdiction 
will often, therefore, be one that a lawyer reasonably could have 
identified under Rule 8.5(b) if she were later confronted with different 
rules from two or more jurisdictions whose rules might apply. 
H. Require Internet Providers of Legal Products to Include 
Appropriate Disclosures and Disclaimers Prominently 
Throughout Their Websites, Promotional Materials, and 
Advertising 
When the Texas legislature amended its unauthorized practice law 
in response to the court decision213 finding that Quicken Family Lawyer 
violated the unauthorized practice law, it specified that the “computer 
software, or similar products” that it was exempting from the law’s reach 
had to “clearly and conspicuously state that the products are not a 
substitute for the advice of an attorney.”214 I recommend that, in addition 
to this disclaimer, these websites must contain the following: 
 If any lawyers have participated in the creation of the program or 
its contents, their names, business addresses, and bar status and bar 
numbers must be posted on the website; 
 If no lawyers participated in the content or creation of the 
program, that must be stated;  
 
with two exceptions. A law firm cannot represent competing claims in the same matter before a 
tribunal. Id. R. 1.7(b)(3). Nor may the parties consent to a representation that is “prohibited by law.” 
Id. R. 1.7(b)(2). 
 213. See supra text accompanying note 120. 
 214. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 81.101(c) (West 2011).  
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 The program must say that the organization selling the product is 
not a law firm and that the ethical duties lawyers have to clients 
might not apply to the transaction between the buyer and seller of 
the product; and  
 The organization should be required to file with an appropriate 
agency wherever it offers its services or products the location of its 
principal place of business and the names and addresses of its 
senior officers, with the fact and location of this filing revealed on 
the organization’s website. 
The goal here is twofold: First, to make the provenance of the 
product clear to the consumer so that there is no ambiguity about the 
nature of the organization with which she is dealing, and second, to 
provide the consumer with the identities of those who may have 
responsibility for the product in the event the consumer believes she may 
have a claim. This is especially important for the lawyers behind the 
product, whose identities might otherwise be difficult to discover. 
Requiring the lawyers to put their names on the product—to accept 
responsibility for it—encourages a level of care that might otherwise be 
lost. 
I would not allow the seller to disclaim or limit liability as a 
condition of the purchase. This position is consistent with ethics rules 
that forbid lawyers to bargain with a client for exemptions from 
prospective malpractice liability unless the client is independently 
represented in the matter.215 Users of programs that dispense legal 
documents will not, of course, be independently represented.216 
Publishers of books containing legal advice do sometimes include a 
disclaimer of accuracy (“every effort has been made”), but online 
services offering legal documents should not enjoy the same option. 
Unlike a book buyer, who knows he is but one of many equally 
positioned buyers, the Internet customer is encouraged to believe that 
the document created by the program is tailored to his particular goals, 
which are identified by his responses to a series of focused questions. 
I. Permit Nonlawyers to Have Equity Interests and Management 
Authority in For-Profit217 Law Firms 
Nonlawyers may manage and participate in law firm income in 
many ways. Today, for example, a law firm may include a nonlawyer in 
the firm’s “compensation or retirement plan even though the plan is 
 
 215. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.8(h) (2010). 
 216. I realize that some users of these services may be lawyers who wish to generate documents for 
their own clients. In representing their clients, with a client’s informed consent, an agreement limiting 
the seller’s liability will satisfy Rule 1.8(h). Id. 
 217. Under current rules and constitutional doctrine, nonlawyers may manage nonprofit 
organizations that offer legal services. Id. R. 5.4 (2010); see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–29 
(1963). 
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based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.”218 This would 
seem to allow compensation tied entirely to the firm’s net profits as 
determined at year’s end. Not allowed is compensation tied to fees in 
particular matters. Nonlawyers may be managers of a law firm so long as 
they are not partners219 and do not have “the right to direct or control the 
professional judgment of a lawyer.”220 
Allowing nonlawyers to share in legal fees other than through a 
compensation plan based on profit sharing, or to be partners in law firms, 
or to have an ownership or directorial interest in a professional 
corporation or association would require significant rule changes. The 
changes could take one of several shapes. One change would allow 
nonlawyer partners221 but add a cap on their percentage interest and 
impose certain other requirements discussed next. A second change 
would allow the same but without limit on their equity participation so 
long as the entity solely practices law. The latter has been the rule in the 
District of Columbia, the only U.S. jurisdiction to permit nonlawyer 
partners and owners, since 1991.222 It has caused no problems according 
to D.C. Bar counsel.223 A more dramatic change would allow a business 
organization to own a law firm. Wal-Mart could place one in its stores 
alongside other service providers, like pharmacists and opticians. An 
even greater change would allow law firms to go public and sell shares on 
a stock exchange, as is now permitted in Australia.224 
An important distinction is needed here. What I propose, and what 
the Washington, D.C. rules allow, is to permit nonlawyers who are 
actively engaged in a law firm’s work to participate in ownership of the 
firm. But the firm must be a law firm, which means it is a single-
disciplinary, not a multidisciplinary, entity. In 2000, the ABA emphatically 
rejected a proposal to permit lawyers and nonlawyers to combine in 
 
 218. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4(a)(3) (2010) (emphasis added). 
 219. Id. R. 5.4(b). 
 220. Id. R. 5.4(d)(3). 
 221. I will use the term “partners” to refer to all arrangements in which nonlawyers have an 
ownership interest in a for-profit law firm, including in professional corporations and associations. 
 222. See D.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4 (2007), which permits a nonlawyer (without limit 
on number) to have a “financial interest” in a law firm if the nonlawyer “performs professional 
services which assist the [firm] in providing legal services to clients”—that is, is not a passive 
investor—so long as the nonlawyer agrees to “abide by [the D.C.] Rules of Professional Conduct” and 
the lawyers in the firm “undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer participants to the same extent 
as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rule 5.1.” Rule 5.1 describes the responsibility of firm 
partners to supervise the firm’s lawyers. Id. R. 5.1. 
 223. Joan C. Rogers, Trio of Federal Suits Challenge Ethics Rule That Stops Private Equity 
Investment in Firms, 27 Law. Man. Prof. Conduct 382, 383 (2011). This may be, however, because 
few firms have taken advantage of the authority because of problems that would arise for their lawyers 
in other jurisdictions. 
 224. Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection: How “Professional Self-Regulation” Should Promote 
Compliance with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 577, 628 (2011). 
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organizations that offer both legal and other services. The rejected 
proposal provided that lawyers should be permitted to share fees and 
join with nonlawyer professionals in a practice that delivers both legal 
and nonlegal professional services (multidisciplinary practice), provided 
that the lawyers have the control and authority necessary to assure 
lawyer independence in the rendering of legal services. “Nonlawyer 
professionals” means members of recognized professions or other 
disciplines that are governed by ethical standards.225 
Instead, the ABA adopted the following resolution: 
[E]ach jurisdiction is urged to revise its law governing lawyers to 
implement the following principles and preserve the core values of the 
legal profession: 
. . . . 
6. Jurisdictions should retain and enforce laws that generally bar the 
practice of law by entities other than law firms. 
7. The sharing of legal fees with non-lawyers and the ownership and 
control of the practice of law by nonlawyers are inconsistent with the 
core values of the legal profession.226 
8. The law governing lawyers, that prohibits lawyers from sharing legal 
fees with nonlawyers and from directly or indirectly transferring to 
nonlawyers ownership or control over entities practicing law, should 
not be revised.227 
In 2000, therefore, the ABA not only opposed multidisciplinary 
practice, it went further and opposed nonlawyer ownership in law firms 
that offer legal services only—that is, that were not multidisciplinary—
and also opposed sharing legal fees between lawyers and nonlawyers. 
Allowing nonlawyers to participate in the legal industry in either of these 
ways was seen as posing an unacceptable threat to the core values of the 
 
 225. DC Bar, Report & Recommendation of the District of Columbia Bar Special Committee on 
Multidisciplinary Practice, http://www.dcbar.org/inside_the_bar/structure/reports/special_committee_on_ 
multidisciplinary_practice/background.cfm (last visited Mar. 17, 2012); see John Eligon, Selling Pieces 
of Law Firms, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 2011, at B1. 
 226. The ABA defined the core values as follows: 
(a) the lawyer’s duty of undivided loyalty to the client; 
(b) the lawyer’s duty competently to exercise independent legal judgment for the benefit of 
the client; 
(c) the lawyer’s duty to hold client confidences inviolate; 
(d) the lawyer’s duty to avoid conflicts of interest with the client; and 
(e) the lawyer’s duty to help maintain a single profession of law with responsibilities as a 
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen having special 
responsibility for the quality of justice. 
(f) The lawyer’s duty to promote access to justice. 
MDP Recommendation—Center for Professional Responsibility, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/professional_responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_practice/mdprecom10f.html (last visited 
Mar. 17, 2012). 
 227. Id. 
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profession. That perception did not depend on evidence; Washington, 
D.C.’s experience with its version of Model Rule 5.4 was not influential.228 
The prediction of harm was intuitive. The risk was deemed too great to 
take a chance. It is doubtful whether any empirical evidence could have 
made a difference.229 
Allowing nonlawyers to become partners (or have equity interests) 
in law firms has obvious benefits. It will make it easier for a firm to 
attract talented professionals who wish to have a vote in the management 
and share in the profits of their businesses on a par with lawyers and for 
whom status as an employee, even a well-compensated one, is deemed 
inadequate recognition of their talents. With other accomplished 
professionals on board, a firm can more easily provide services ancillary 
to legal services (called “law-related services”), as Model Rule 5.7 
permits—for example, a financial advisor can contribute to the work of a 
firm that offers estate planning advice, an environmental scientist or 
architect can aid the law clients of a construction law firm, a licensed 
investigator can prove valuable to a criminal defense firm, and a doctor 
or nurse may benefit a medical malpractice firm. But even granting these 
advantages, what can be done to ensure that the presence of nonlawyers 
as owners and managers does not threaten the core values of the 
profession that the ABA identified in 2000? What can give us comfort 
that the nonlawyers will not lead lawyers astray? 
Many might argue that no comfort is necessary because the 
premise—that the nonlawyers will seek to undermine the core values and 
that lawyers will either succumb or stand quietly by—is wrong, even 
insulting, to all concerned. Lawyers have no right to assume, they may 
argue, that the presence of others poses a threat to legal clients. Lawyers 
have no basis to claim moral superiority as a categorical matter. As it 
happens, we do not have to take sides in this contest, let alone 
empirically test the competing arguments, assuming that it would even be 
possible to do so. We should be able to reduce the risk of nonlawyer 
imposition sufficiently to enable us modestly to allow others into the 
legal services market. 
As of March 2009, England and Wales have allowed what are called 
Legal Disciplinary Practices (“LDPs”). Solicitors, barristers, notaries, 
conveyancers, and others, including certain foreign lawyers and 
nonlawyers, may combine in an LDP. Nonlawyers must be found 
“suitable” by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, which can also withdraw 
approval.230 Nonlawyer ownership of a firm is capped at twenty-five 
 
 228. See supra text accompanying note 222. 
 229. Later reporting on Arthur Andersen’s participation in the collapse of Enron could be seen to 
vindicate that worry. See, e.g., Reed Abelson & Jonathan D. Glater, Who’s Keeping the Accountants 
Accountable?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 2002, at C1. 
 230. Solicitor’s Regulation Auth. Recognized Bodies Reg. 5 (2010) (U.K.). 
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percent. An LDP can practice only law. Passive investors are not 
allowed.231 By 2012, the U.K. anticipates that it will go further and allow 
what has come to be known as Alternate Business Structures (“ABS”).232 
An ABS may have passive investors (sometimes called Tesco law in the 
expectation that retailers will create law firms to provide routine services 
to consumers). Shares in an ABS can be publicly traded. An ABS can 
offer multidisciplinary services, not just legal services. Once the ABS 
structure is approved, there will be no further need for a separate LDP 
category.233 
I do not recommend that regulation of the American bar copy the 
U.K. innovations unchanged (or at this stage perhaps we should say the 
U.K. experiment). But I do think that the LDP structure in the U.K. 
coupled with the safeguards in the Washington, D.C. version of Model 
Rule 5.4 have something to teach us about how to reduce the risk that 
nonlawyer managers or owners of law firms will tempt (or order) lawyers 
to misbehave. Risk can be adequately eliminated, insofar as risk can ever 
be eliminated, if:  
 Nonlawyer participation is limited as in the U.K. to twenty-five 
percent;  
 The law firm limits its services to legal and law-related services;  
 An appropriate regulatory body is authorized to approve 
nonlawyer owners as suitable to participate in the law industry 
(much as character committees approve new lawyers);  
 The regulatory body can also remove this approval for misconduct 
(the equivalent of disbarment);  
 The nonlawyer owners commit themselves to compliance with the 
jurisdiction’s ethical rules for lawyers and take a mandatory course 
in those rules, refreshed periodically just as states may require 
lawyers to have CLE credits in legal ethics annually;  
 The lawyer owners take responsibility to supervise this compliance;  
 The legal and ethical rules governing the profession of the 
nonlawyer owners do not require or forbid conduct contrary to the 
commandments of the law and ethics governing lawyers; and  
 Nonlawyers cannot direct the work of lawyers.  
 
 231. Solicitor’s Regulation Auth. Code of Conduct R. 12.01 (2007) (U.K.); see also Legal 
Services Act, 2007, c. 29 (U.K.). 
 232. Sofia Lind, Alternative Business Structure Launched Under U.K. Legal Services Act, Legal 
Week (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/law/international/LawArticleIntl.jsp?id=1202518170381. 
 233. Movement toward authority for ABS is continuing, but the timetable is dependent on various 
approvals. The best way to stay abreast of developments is at the website of the Solicitors Regulation 
Authority. These two pages, with internal hyperlinks, will be helpful. FAQs: Legal Services Act and 
ABSs, Solicitors Regulation Auth., http://www.sra.org.uk/sra/legal-services-act/faqs/ABS-faqs.page 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2012); Alternative Business Structures, Solicitors Regulation Auth., 
http://www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/freedom-in-practice/alternative-business-structures.page (last visited Mar. 
17, 2012). The latter page envisioned ABS authority by the end of 2011. 
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This is not to say that these precautions are an insurance policy or 
warranty against bad behavior, but neither do we enjoy equivalent 
assurances today from the bar. Whoever populates the business of law, 
there will never be guarantees.234 
J. Ease Temporary and Permanent Admission to Practice in the 
United States for Applicants with Foreign Law Degrees 
U.S. jurisdictions vary greatly in their willingness to allow foreign-
trained law graduates, including lawyers admitted abroad, to work in the 
United States either temporarily or permanently, and if permanently, in 
the scope of the authority allowed them. Efforts should be made to 
harmonize the rules and liberalize them. 
1. Current Rules: Regular Admission of Foreign Lawyers and Law 
Graduates 
I consider first rules in New York and California, which are far and 
away the most generous in permitting foreign-trained lawyers and law 
graduates to sit for their bar examinations. I then look at a few other 
states. 
The New York Court of Appeals rule on allowing foreign-educated 
lawyers to take the New York bar examination is section 520.6.235 It is 
compactly worded and next to impossible to unravel. It recognizes three 
categories for admission. Only those applicants falling within the first 
category qualify to take the New York bar without further graduate law 
study. 
The first category encompasses graduates of law schools in countries 
whose jurisprudence is “based upon the principles of English Common 
Law.”236 These graduates may take the New York State bar examination 
if the “period of law study” meets the same “durational” requirements 
imposed on U.S. law graduates, and if the “program and course of study” 
is “the substantial equivalent” of what is required by an “approved” U.S. 
law school.237 So a graduate of Oxford who studied law for as long as New 
York State requires for a U.S. law student, and whose curriculum is the 
“substantial equivalent” of what is required in the United States, may 
take the bar examination without more. She need not be a member of 
 
 234. Advances in information technology to some extent make moot the ABA’s decision about 
whether to continue to fence others out. “The question used to be: ‘Will the ABA change Rule 5.4?,’” 
University of Illinois Law Professor Larry Ribstein asked rhetorically as reported in the ABA Journal. 
“The question now is, ‘Who cares?’” was his reply. Barbara Rose, Law, the Investment, ABA J., 
Sept. 1, 2010, at 44. 
 235. N.Y. Ct. App. R. 520.6 (2012). The description here is to Rule 520.6 as amended on April 27, 
2011, which becomes effective as of the July 2013 bar examination. 
 236. Id. 
 237.  Id. 
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any bar or ever have visited the United States or taken classes at a U.S. 
law school. 
If the applicant does not meet the durational requirement for U.S. 
law study but has “at least two years of substantially equivalent 
education,” meaning in a common-law school, or if the applicant meets 
the durational requirement for U.S. law study but does not have a 
“substantially equivalent education,” then she may take the New York 
bar examination if she earns an LL.M. degree.238 But if the candidate 
lacks both the durational and the substantive requirements, the 
additional study will not compensate. The additional study must occur in 
the United States.239 
The final category encompasses those law graduates who are 
already admitted to practice in a country “whose jurisprudence is based 
upon principles of English Common Law” and whose “admission was 
based upon a program of study in a law school and/or law office.”240 The 
differences between this category and the prior categories are the 
recognition of law office study and the requirement of admission to the 
bar of a common-law country. If, then, the applicant’s study is 
“durationally equivalent” under New York’s rules for U.S. law 
graduates, but not “substantially equivalent” to the course of study in a 
U.S. law school, she can compensate for the lack of the substantial 
equivalence through the same further study set forth for category two, 
with the same conditions and limitations.241 The legislative history for 
category three explains that it is meant specifically to benefit solicitors in 
the U.K. whose legal education includes both classroom study and an 
“articled clerkship.”242 
For the first two routes to admission, the respective rule requires 
that the candidate’s school have been “recognized by the competent 
accrediting agency of the government of such other country, or of a 
political subdivision thereof” during the candidate’s course of study.243 In 
2010, 77% of applicants to the New York bar who were graduates of an 
 
 238. Id. R. 520.6(b)(1)(ii). 
 239. The LL.M. must include twenty-four credit hours. Two of those credits must be in the history, 
rules, values, instructions, responsibilities, and goals of the American legal profession (in other words, 
a legal ethics course); two must be in legal research, analysis, and writing; two must be in a course 
“designed to introduce students to distinctive aspects and/or fundamental principles of United States 
law,” such as civil procedure or constitutional law; and six other credits must be in subjects on the New 
York bar examination. Some of these requirements can be combined. Id. R. 520.6(b)(3)(iv)–(vi). 
 240. Id. R. 520.6(b)(2). 
 241. Id. 
 242. The legislative history of the rule is helpfully explained by its drafters. See Howard A. Levine 
& Hope B. Engel, New York’s Revised Attorney Admission Rules: Still Rigorous but More “User 
Friendly,” Bar Examiner, Aug. 1998, at 42. Howard Levine was then a judge on the New York Court 
of Appeals. Id. at 43.  
 243. N.Y. Ct. App. R. 5.26(b). 
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ABA-approved law school passed the examination.244 The passing rate 
for foreign law graduates was 34%.245 New York had 4596 foreign law 
graduate applicants.246 
California’s rules also are permissive but not in the same way. So it 
is possible that an applicant may qualify to take the examination in 
California but not New York, or vice versa. A graduate of a foreign law 
school may qualify to take the California bar if she has an additional year 
of study in a U.S. law school (leading to an LL.M. degree requiring at 
least twenty credits or on completion of twenty credits even without a 
degree).247 The applicant’s undergraduate degree must either satisfy the 
educational requirements for admission to the bar in the country in 
which the school is located or the undergraduate education must be 
“substantially equivalent” to the requirements for a J.D. degree from an 
ABA-accredited school or a school accredited by the California State 
Bar’s Committee of Bar Examiners.248 The subsequent U.S. law school 
study need not occur in the United States but must include at least four 
courses tested on the California bar examination, and one of those 
courses must be a professional responsibility course that covers sections 
of the California Rules of Professional Conduct and sections of the 
California Business and Professions Code.249 
California’s rules are especially generous if the applicant is a 
member of a bar anywhere in the world and regardless of education. 
That applicant may take the state bar examination with no further 
educational requirement.250 In 2010, 60% of applicants to the California 
bar who were graduates of an ABA-approved law school passed the 
examination.251 The passing rate for foreign law graduates was 13%.252 
The state had 724 foreign law graduate applicants, the second largest of 
any U.S. jurisdiction.253 
Other U.S. jurisdictions get a trickle of foreign-educated applicants 
and vary in their requirements for admission. Here are the requirements 
and passage rates of those with at least 15 applicants in 2010. 
Tennessee: The applicant must have graduated from a law school 
“recognized and approved by the competent accrediting agency” of a 
 
 244. 2010 Statistics, supra note 140, at 11. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. State Bar of Cal., Guidelines for Implementation of Chapter 2, Rule 4.30 of the 
Admissions Rules, Guideline 1.2(A)–(B) (2009). 
 248. Id. Guideline 1.1(A)–(B). 
 249. Id. Guideline 1.2(A)–(B). 
 250. Cal. State Bar R. 4.30(B). 
 251. 2010 Statistics, supra note 140, at 10. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
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country;254 must “satisfy the Board that his or her undergraduate 
education and legal education were substantially equivalent to the 
requirements” for U.S. law graduates;255 and must complete twenty-four 
credits “in residence at a law school approved by the [ABA] or [have] 
successfully earned one-third of the credits necessary to graduate from a 
law school approved by the Board.”256 In 2010, 79% of graduates from 
ABA-accredited law schools passed the Tennessee bar examination.257 Of 
the 123 foreign-educated students who took the examination, 28% 
passed.258  
District of Columbia: Graduates of non-ABA law schools must 
complete twenty-six semester hours of study in an ABA law school in 
subjects tested on the D.C. bar examination.259 In 2010, 47% of graduates 
from ABA-accredited law schools passed the D.C. bar examination.260 Of 
the 76 foreign-educated students who took the examination, 18% passed.261 
Louisiana: An applicant’s legal education must be “equivalent to 
that of the legal education offered in the United States . . . by a law 
school accredited by the [ABA]. The [ABA’s] standards . . . shall be 
relevant to any equivalency determination.”262 The applicant must also 
complete “a minimum of fourteen semester hours of credit, or the 
equivalent, in professional law subjects from an American law school” 
but not more than four credits can be in any one subject. In 2010, 62% of 
graduates from ABA-accredited law schools passed the Louisiana bar 
examination.263 Of the 40 foreign-educated students who took the 
examination, 15% passed.264 
Illinois: Applicants must have practiced law five out of the previous 
seven years. The board must determine that the  
quality of the applicant’s preliminary, college and legal education is 
acceptable based on [among other things] the jurisprudence of the 
country . . . the curriculum of the law schools attended and the course 
of studies pursued . . . accreditation of the law schools attended . . . by 
competent accrediting authorities in the foreign country . . . [and] post-
graduate studies and degrees earned [abroad and in the US] . . . .265  
 
 254. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 7, art. 7. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. 2010 Statistics, supra note 140, at 11. 
 258. Id. 
 259. D.C. Cir. R. 46(b)(4). 
 260. 2010 Statistics, supra note 140, at 11. 
 261. Id. 
 262. La. Sup. Ct. R. XVII, § 6(B). 
 263. 2010 Statistics, supra note 140, at 11. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 715. 
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In 2010, 84% of graduates from an ABA-accredited law school passed 
the Illinois bar examination.266 Of the 24 foreign-educated students who 
took the examination, 17% passed.267 
Texas: Applicants must have completed three years of study at a 
foreign law school “accredited in the jurisdiction where it exists” leading 
to the equivalent of a J.D. degree.268 The applicant must also have been 
engaged in active practice for five out of the previous seven years and 
either have an LL.M. from an ABA-accredited school or “demonstrat[e] 
to the Board that the law of such foreign nation is sufficiently 
comparable to the law of Texas that, in the judgment of the Board, it 
enables the foreign attorney to become a competent attorney in Texas 
without additional formal legal education.”269 If the applicant’s practice is 
only three out of five years, she must both make this demonstration and 
have an LL.M. from an ABA-accredited school.270 In 2010, 76% of 
graduates from an ABA-accredited law school passed the Texas bar 
examination.271 Of the 15 foreign-educated students who took the 
examination, 33% passed.272 
Massachusetts: Foreign law graduates may qualify to take the state 
bar examination with “a prior determination of their education from the 
Board of Bar Examiners.”273 In 2010, 85% of graduates from an ABA-
accredited law school passed the Massachusetts bar examination.274 Of 
the 22 foreign-educated students who took the examination, 50% 
passed.275 
2. Current Rules: Other Forms of Authorized Presence for Foreign 
Lawyers 
The patchwork of rules that enable foreign lawyers to work in the 
United States without traditional bar admission defies easy description. 
One of the three most important rules is the Foreign Legal Consultant 
(“FLC”) rule, which allows lawyers admitted in other countries to 
practice permanently in the United States but does not permit them to 
advise on U.S. law.276 They may be partners in U.S. law firms.277 An FLC 
 
 266. 2010 Statistics, supra note 140, at 11. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Tex. Bd. of Law Exam’rs R. XIII(b). 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. 
 271. 2010 Statistics, supra note 140, at 11. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Mass. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs R. VI.1. 
 274. 2010 Statistics, supra note 140, at 11. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Model Rules for the Licensing and Practice of Foreign Legal Consultants § 9 (2010). 
Not everyone admitted abroad is a “lawyer” for purposes of the FLC rule. The model FLC rule 
defines a “lawyer” as an individual who is, and for at least five years has been, a member in good 
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rule, based on the ABA model rule, has been adopted in thirty-one 
states.278 
Less prominent are house counsel rules that include foreign lawyers. 
A house counsel admission rule offers a separate admission category for 
lawyers who are employed by their (usually corporate or organizational) 
client and who will represent only that client or its organizational 
affiliates.279 The house counsel rule enables a lawyer transferred to a new 
state to practice in the new state without having to get admitted to its 
bar, either by examination or, if recognized, on motion. The authority to 
practice in the new state ends if and when the lawyer leaves her job, 
unless she takes a qualifying new one. House counsel rules have been 
adopted in thirty-four states and are generally based on a model ABA 
rule.280 However, the ABA model rule and the house counsel rule in most 
states that have adopted one require that the lawyer be admitted to a 
U.S. jurisdiction’s bar.281 Only six states include foreign-admitted lawyers 
in their house-counsel rule.282 
The third rule that allows foreign lawyers to enter the United States 
is the counterpart to the multijurisdictional practice (“MJP”) rule for 
domestic lawyers who temporarily cross state borders in connection with 
their work.283 The ABA adopted such a rule at the same time that it 
adopted the MJP rule in the Model Rules, but it adopted the foreign 
MJP rule as a proposed court rule, not as an amendment to the Model 
Rules.284 Perhaps for this reason, when states adopted the MJP rules for 
domestic lawyers through amendment of Model Rule 5.5, the 
recommendation for foreign lawyer MJP was not before them. Only 
seven states have extended their MJP rules to foreign lawyers.285 
 
standing of a recognized legal profession in a foreign country, the members of which are admitted to 
practice as lawyers or counselors at law or the equivalent and are subject to effective regulation and 
discipline by a duly constituted professional body or a public authority. Id. § 1. 
 277. Id. § 5(b)(i)(B). 
 278.  ABA, Foreign Legal Consultant Rules (2010). 
 279. ABA Section of Legal Educ. and Admissions to the Bar, Report to the House of 
Delegates (2006). 
 280. Id.; ABA, In-House Corporate Counsel Registration Rules (2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/in_house_rules.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 281.  Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. ABA Comm’n on Multijurisdictional Practice, Report 201J (2002), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mjp/201j.authcheckdam.pdf. The scope of 
practice of the MJP rule for foreign lawyers differs slightly to make it clear that their orbit of 
temporary practice in the United States must be more closely tied to their home jurisdiction. See 
Stephen Gillers, Lessons from the Multijurisdictional Practice Commission: The Art of Making Change, 
44 Ariz. L. Rev. 685, 714 (2002). 
 284. Report 201J, supra note 283. 
 285. Laurel Terry, Summary of State Action on ABA MJP Recommendations 8 & 9 (2011). 
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3. Recommended Uniform Changes 
The same changes in information technology and the same global 
trends that are diminishing the importance of state borders in the 
regulation of lawyers are affecting international borders. That has long 
been clear in the European Union, where movement of lawyers among 
nations, permanently and temporarily, is now permitted with minor 
qualifications, despite the fact that the migrating lawyers come from 
different countries with different legal traditions.286 American rules have 
been generous to foreign lawyers. The FLC rule, which has been broadly 
adopted, allows foreign lawyers to come here permanently and advise on 
the law of any non-U.S. jurisdiction,287 thereby also benefiting foreign 
nationals in the United States who need such advice and Americans who 
do so as well. 
Adding foreign lawyers to the in-house counsel rule would be a 
sensible liberalization. An in-house counsel rule that permitted foreign 
lawyers to work for their organizational employer at a U.S.-based office 
differs from the FLC rule in two ways. First, an in-house counsel rule 
allows the lawyer to advise only her employer and its organizational 
affiliates, whereas the FLC rule allows the lawyer to advise anyone. 
Neither permits court appearances unless the lawyer can gain pro hac 
vice status. But the in-house counsel rule would allow the lawyer to 
advise her employer on the law of any jurisdiction, including the United 
States, whereas the FLC rule limits advice to non-U.S. law. This 
expansion of authority makes great sense. Some foreign lawyers may be 
expert in areas of U.S. law just as some U.S. lawyers are expert in some 
aspect of foreign law. 
Second, expansion of the in-house rule to include foreign lawyers 
would change only geography. A foreign lawyer is free to give advice on 
U.S. law to her employer in her home country. The United States cannot 
prevent other nations from allowing their lawyers to advise on U.S. law 
at home just as American lawyers, if competent, can advise on a foreign 
nation’s law at home. A change in the rule would simply allow a foreign 
in-house lawyer to advise her employer on the same U.S. law in the 
United States. Nor is a stricter rule necessary to protect the company 
from incompetence. Companies that are large enough to transfer (say) a 
Spanish lawyer to an office in the United States should be sophisticated 
enough to make intelligent decisions about the source of advice they 
receive. Further, they are likely to have U.S. lawyers in the United States 
available to advise on U.S. law when necessary. In the states that do 
allow foreign in-house lawyer admission, no problems have been 
reported. 
 
 286. See Davis, supra note 194, at 1357–58. 
 287. See supra notes 276–78 and accompanying text. 
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The model pro hac vice rule should also be expanded to allow 
judges, in their discretion, to admit foreign lawyers to co-counsel with a 
local lawyer during litigation. The safeguards here are several and the 
advantages clear. The trial judge would have discretion to grant or deny 
a foreign lawyer’s pro hac vice admission application, just as she can do 
now with domestic applications.288 The model rule requires that a local 
lawyer participate in the matter and be responsible for the lawyer 
admitted pro hac vice.289 The pro hac vice application must be made on 
notice to the adverse party, which can object if it believes its interests are 
compromised.290 The advantage of permitting pro hac vice admission of 
foreign lawyers is that doing so respects the decision of the litigant to 
choose the counsel who will represent her. In our adversary system, that 
choice has a high value, although of course it must sometimes yield to 
other interests.291 Representation by a foreign lawyer along with the local 
lawyer is likely to occur most often when there is a foreign law dimension 
to the litigation and the foreign lawyer can assist local co-counsel best by 
full participation. Beyond foreign law, the foreign lawyer may be more 
familiar with the client and the foreign context that forms part of the 
dispute. In the states that do allow foreign lawyer pro hac vice admission, 
there has been no report of a problem, although we do not know how 
often the authority is invoked.292 
Aside from expansion of the in-house and pro hac vice rules, the third 
area ripe for reform is the body of rules governing foreign law graduate 
admission to the bar of a U.S. jurisdiction. As shown above,293 states vary 
significantly in their willingness to let foreign-educated law graduates (who 
may or may not be admitted to a bar) take their bar examinations, with 
New York and California the most generous, although they are generous 
in different ways. The question is complicated by the following issues:  
 Applicants may come from civil- or common-law schools;  
 In most of the world, law is an undergraduate program;  
 Applicants will not have been required to study the professional 
conduct rules governing American lawyers, as the ABA requires 
for approval of domestic law schools;294  
 
 288. The application requires the lawyer to reveal information about herself, including whether 
she has been disciplined in any jurisdiction in which she is admitted. Model Rule on Pro Hac Vice 
Admission (2002). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163–64 (1988) (disqualifying the defendant’s chosen 
counsel to avoid a possible conflict of interest). 
 292. In a recent high-profile case, a Canadian lawyer joined in the defense of Conrad Black, 
former CEO of Hollinger International. Bryan Burrough, The Convictions of Conrad Black, Vanity 
Fair, Oct. 2011, at 252.  
 293. See supra text accompanying notes 236–275. 
 294. ABA Standards, supra note 42, at 20. 
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 The quality of an applicant’s legal education will be difficult to 
ascertain, especially if the foreign nation in which it occurred does 
not have a credible (or any) process to approve law schools;  
 Applicants likely will not have been exposed to the basic structure 
of the American legal system;  
 The civil-law applicant likely will not have been exposed to 
common-law reasoning or to traditionally required courses like 
torts, civil procedure, and contracts;  
 The bar passage rates in states that do admit foreign law graduates 
are low, in some states abysmally low, which may deter a decision 
to invest time and money in reform; and  
 Many foreign law graduates may not ever have visited, let alone 
lived in, the United States. Some observers view absence of 
experience with American culture, including legal culture, gained 
by living in the United States and attending a U.S. law school, as a 
critical deficiency.295 
The complexity of this issue encourages caution. Any decision to 
open admission to foreign law school graduates, with or without graduate 
law study in the United States, should be modest and should depend on 
each graduate’s legal education and experience. Moving slowly means 
that the distinctions we make may appear arbitrary. But it will be easier 
to expand the authority later, if warranted, than to contract it. The 
ABA’s Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar has been 
studying this issue and is considering a model court rule on the admission 
of foreign-educated law graduates.296 
I add a word about reciprocity. Should liberalizing the rules on 
foreign lawyer practice in the United States be conditioned on the 
reciprocal treatment of American lawyers by the countries from which 
the foreign lawyers come? Nations vary in their tolerance for foreign 
lawyer presence, and even those that allow it may severely limit how they 
practice.297 Whether any liberalization of the American rules should have 
 
 295. This view explains the New York Court of Appeals’ requirement that those foreign applicants 
who must earn graduate law degrees from a U.S. law school in order to qualify to take the state 
examination study physically in the United States. A degree earned abroad, from the same school with 
the same requirements, is not acceptable. N.Y. Ct. App. R. 520.6(b)(3)(v). 
 296. See ABA Section of Legal Educ. & Admission to the Bar, Report, ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/ 
council_reports_and_resolutions/20110420_model_rule_and_criteria_foreign_lawyers.authcheckdam.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 297. India has one of the most exclusionary approaches but may be relenting. In February 2012, 
the Chennai High Court held that foreign law firms could advise on foreign law in India on a 
temporary basis and could represent clients in arbitrations based in India. India’s High Court Lets 
Foreign Firms Visit, Law. Wkly., http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/indias-high-court-lets-foreign-
firms-visit (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). Canada has one of the most inviting approaches. Four of the 
“largest and fastest-growing national economies”—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—have “some of 
the most restrictive policies toward foreign lawyers.” Anna Stolley Persky, The New World: Despite 
Globalization of the Economy, Lawyers Are Finding New Barriers to Practicing on Foreign Soil, 
ABA J., Nov. 1, 2011, at 34.  
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a reciprocity clause is beyond the focus of this Article. Reciprocity is 
about trade barriers, their wisdom, and effect. 
K. Increase the Likelihood of Competent Representation 
How do we now assure quality? We do so ex ante with educational 
requirements and a bar examination.298 Thereafter, we subject lawyers to 
civil law liability for malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty. Civil law 
claims compensate for actionable conduct causing harm. They operate 
retroactively, not preventively. But their existence should also encourage 
lawyers to take care in order to avoid liability in the first place. A 
relatively new device to foster competence is continuing legal education. 
But the CLE hurdle is often quite low and easily satisfied. Yet another 
vehicle meant to signal special competence is certifications in a 
specialty.299 
How might we better assure competent work? Several ways are 
apparent, although a few will meet strong resistance. First, the CLE 
requirement can be more demanding: no self-reporting by a lawyer who 
has read an article or listened to a tape while driving. Attendance at least 
two full days a year at a live CLE event can be mandated. Second, states 
can raise their bar passage scores.300 To the extent that bar examinations 
test skills, legal reasoning, judgment, and general knowledge, not the 
minutiae of a state’s practice, higher passing scores should improve the 
quality of the bar. Third, we can revisit the idea of specialization, and 
heighten the requirements, so that lawyers skilled in an area of practice 
can offer a credible additional credential. The heightened requirements 
can include additional coursework, practice experience, and a further 
examination. 
Conclusion 
Institutions and government will sometimes change rules to 
facilitate or encourage behavior deemed beneficial. More often, perhaps, 
they react to changes when and as appropriate. Reaction often will be 
the wiser course, so as to prevent precipitous action. What is not wise is 
intransigence when the gap between socially beneficial conduct and the 
rules that constrict the conduct grows large. We have entered such a 
period for the rules governing the legal marketplace, and it is in large 
part a product of changing technology and the cross-border activity of 
 
 298. See supra text accompanying notes 33–55. 
 299. See, e.g., Fla. Bar R. 4-7.2(c)(6) (identifying several specialist certifications that a lawyer may 
advertise). 
 300. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 560, 574 (1984) (finding that the Arizona Supreme Court 
Committee on Examinations and Admissions’ act of setting a passing score for the state’s bar 
examination was state action and not governed by antitrust law). 
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lawyers and clients. Reasonable people will disagree on when and how 
the profession and the courts should react to this gap. But doing nothing 
is not an option. I hope my recommendations will advance the 
conversation about how the profession should respond. 
